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Letters

Green Stamps

David Hapgood's piece, "Diplomaism: How We Zone People" [*The Washington Monthly*, May, 1969], was a gem. Each reader ought to send a copy to a dean of his choice.

Students are the customers of the university, but they almost never demand better meat, produce, or canned goods. They get deceptive packages each semester. They just don't seem to care about the merchandise they receive. What they do focus on is the "green stamps" they get at the checkout counter. The "green stamps" have become all-important. You glue them into your stamp book, which at the universities we call a transcript. If you collect enough stamps in your book, you can take it to the redemption center some June and turn it in for the only prize in the university's premium catalog, a diploma.

SIDNEY B. SIMON

Mr. Simon is an associate professor of education at Temple University.

Pavlov at the Pentagon

Here is a pattern of behavior which bureaucracy tends to produce:

In Pentagon offices, as well as elsewhere, the telephone takes precedence over the human being. The acceptance of telephone priority is widespread in that increasingly impersonal production system which we still think of as a society. We pay more attention to a bell than to a live human.

In large offices, it has become the general practice to give the telephone priority over any person old-fashioned enough to visit one at one's desk. Congressional secretaries, for example, are much more attentive and helpful to the constituent on the phone than to the drab-looking office visitor, who is made to sit for a long time while phones ring and are cooed into.

We cite the Pentagon only because it is the largest set of offices with which we are personally familiar. Here we have "action officers," the term generally applied to harassed middle-grade military or civilian employees who must keep papers moving away from their desks in order to survive. If an action officer goes to see another action officer, this is known as "personal contact."

However, it is a Pentagon tribal custom, accepted by both parties, that any human visiting a desk in this manner is secondary when the bell or buzzer sounds—unless, of course, the visitor is someone of a higher military or civilian grade. This latter qualification is important; one never keeps a boss waiting. If the boss is making a "personal contact" visit to an action officer, the action officer usually answers the phone with, "May I call you back, Jim? I have to rush now." This makes the boss feel good and is considered sound practice.

Whatever violence it may do to our sense of proportion, the precedence of telephonic over direct communication does have its virtues. Telephone conversations on business matters tend toward an economy of language that might be rude in the "personal contact" encounter. In face-to-face dealings, individual personality quirks must be coped with, and in frequent cases they become a problem that one would prefer to avoid.

A.B.M.

A.B.M. is the pseudonym of a civilian action officer at the Pentagon.

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Kenya and Tanzania:
DEVELOPMENTAL CONTRAST
by Peter Edelman

In the course of this decade the politics and problems of Africa have gradually etched themselves into the American consciousness. Repression in South Africa, revolution in Algeria, the murder of Lumumba, the adventures of Tshombe, the secession of Rhodesia, war and starvation in Biafra—all of these have brought us to a level of awareness far more acute than it was when the Kingston Trio used to sing, "They're rioting in Africa."



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Yet there are still dozens of nations and millions of square miles about which Americans know very little. And among the nations about which least is known are Kenya and Tanzania. In American lore, Jomo Kenyatta is remembered as the fearsome leader of the Mau Mau, and Julius Nyerere, courtesy of *Time* magazine, is known as "an unabashed admirer of Mao Tse-tung."

Even beyond a correction of such misleading lore, both Kenya and Tanzania are worth knowing a good deal more about. They reflect a fascinating contrast in approaches to independence, economic and social development, and institution-building—a contrast which is instructive about the development process generally, and even about race relations in America. And the two countries present an interesting vignette of American foreign policy during a decade that has taken us from a time of American initiative and mutual respect to a situation of disrepair typical of what the war in Vietnam has wrought for us over much of the globe.

Kenya obtained its independence from Britain in 1963, two years later than Tanzania (then Tanganyika), because of the far greater British economic interests and far larger European population in Kenya. Tanganyika, in fact, was never a British colony, but was rather a trust territory which the British administered after the Germans lost it in World War I. These facts have influenced the paths of the two countries since. Kenya has followed a "trickle-down" theory of development—let entrepreneurial skill and capital, which are scarce indigenously, in from the outside, so that factories and jobs and skills can be created in the country for the future. Tanzania, with far smaller vested interests from outside the country, has followed a line of developing its own economy and institutions, conscious that a lower growth rate may result but hopeful that more stable progress can be made. The two are a microcosm of the alternatives available to the third world, and, without too much stretching, they may also represent different possible approaches to poverty area development in the United States.

Although only time will tell whether one approach is more successful and helps build a freer, more egalitarian society than the other, this visitor had a distinct preference. It began to develop on my first exposure to Nairobi, a most un-African city. Apart from its African quarters, it looks like a smallish, newish British city, with its modern government buildings, its British street names and British-style street signs and billboards, its traffic circles, and its walrus moustaches around the New Stanley and the Norfolk Hotels. All of this would be no more than just amusingly unreal but for the fact that this Bristol-on-the-equator is not all there is. It has Watts grafted on. The contrast between the squalid, crowded, segregated African sections and the affluent, beautiful, landscaped, sometimes palatial English and Indian sections (segregated from each other) is sickening.

Now the questions about the development approach come a little faster. One does not have to know much about America's racial crisis to know that such disparities are dangerous. Is it really worth having the foreign skill and capital there? Will the Kenyans be able to get control of the economy—and of their society—when they want it? They say privately that they can always nationalize industry if they have to—just throw the outsiders out when they won't let Kenyans onto the boards of directors and into positions of control. But it may not be that easy. If, for example, plants are dependent on European markets to sell their goods, which is likely, it may be very hard indeed.

Peter Edelman visited Kenya and Tanzania, under a Ford Foundation grant, as part of a study of community development and social change. He was formerly legislative assistant to Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

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There are further questions. Where do the profits go? Some go outside the country, or to the Europeans who live in the country. That is part of the trickle-down approach—profits to the entrepreneurs and investors in exchange for factories, jobs, and imparted skills. Some go to ministers in the government in exchange for licenses and leases and rulings. That is so prevalent in the third world that it, too, seems part of the trickle-down approach—think of Thailand, Pakistan, Formosa, the Philippines, South Vietnam. Some profits go to the Asians who are the shopkeepers of the country. What goes to the worker and the tribesman out in the bush? Very little.

These tremendous disparities in income and status add up to some big questions about the future. And the future may be the present rather soon. Kenyatta has been in declining health for some time and may even be a little senile now. But Kenyatta is still a great man, loved and revered by all, a revolutionary become national hero become conservative leader. Despite his failing health, his very being holds the country together. As one American expert on Africa told me, "his government is not anybody's patsy." The development approach I have described is a conscious gamble, albeit influenced by pre-independence relationships. It is not some venal conspiracy to exploit the country, at least not on the part of Kenyatta and the other dedicated, competent, relatively honest leaders like Tom Mboya. Even the corruption in government, mild by Asian standards, is, I am sure, regarded as necessary to keep the wheels greased and to minimize bureaucratic delay. With some, it may not even be inconsistent with patriotism and dedication.

But when Kenyatta goes, things may be different. The country may not hold. The Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, is regarded as the likely successor. He is also the Minister of the Interior, and, as such, runs the police. This scares many people. Incipient tribal rivalries simmer near the surface. Mboya, for example, though bright and committed, is a Luo in a country where it is almost essential to be a Kikuyu to wield substantial power. (Arap Moi is a Kikuyu.) And precisely because of his competence, Mboya is viewed jealously and is mistrusted by his fellow politicians. His effectiveness is therefore limited and his future uncertain.

Another problem for the future is that, for whatever reason, there has been too little institution-building in the country. Instead of putting down roots, Kenyatta's KANU party has reinforced its hold on power by doing some dirty political dealings. When local elections were held last year, the opposition candidates found themselves disqualified, on technical grounds, one by one, in every constituency where they attempted to file. And government programs to develop institutions appear weak. The country is richly endowed (and breathtakingly beautiful). It could easily feed all of its people. Yet I saw severe malnutrition and people with nothing to do except primitive subsistence farming. There is a rural settlement program, concentrated mainly in the fertile highlands on the land of former white settlers. There is also a training program for community development workers. But these programs are neither effective enough nor extensive enough. It was my impression that the government is just not putting much priority behind them. For example, I met one lady who was conscientiously trying to develop a home handicrafts industry among women. She was a government employee, but she was getting precious little financial backing from the government for her efforts. She, in turn, introduced me to the man in charge of developing agricultural cooperatives. He was vague as to just

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how many of these there were in existence, and whether the emphasis was on marketing or production cooperatives, or both. When I tried to engage him in discussion about the problems he was encountering in making cooperatives work in Kenya, he was evasive and even flip.

The incipient tribalism is just the other side of the coin of the lack of institution-building. When tribal leaders around the country have not been involved in a real nation-building process, as seems to be the case, they may pull away from the center if they have the chance. And they may get it after Kenyatta.

Tanzania is different. Per capita income there is only $73 annually as opposed to $119 in Kenya (the average for black Africa is $123), so the Kenyans would no doubt say that the Tanzanians are merely redistributing poverty. But my impression was that they are doing far more: they are building a stable society. The country's growth rate is somewhat lower than Kenya's. This is at least partly because the Tanzanian government has placed a great emphasis on being involved on a joint-venture basis in enterprises involving foreign capital. But this policy also means that the economic institutions being built will belong at least partially to Tanzania and produce profits for it, thus avoiding major problems for the future. Tanzania's approach to foreign aid is similar: they will take it from anyone but with no strings attached.

Moreover, Tanzania may have the most (maybe even the only) effective anti-corruption program of any developing nation. Parliament members cannot own shares in businesses, cannot be corporate directors, and cannot have both a government salary and an outside income (one must be given up). The government has stopped providing Mercedes-Benzes for its cabinet ministers. Senator Dodd, Justice Fortas, Senator Dirksen, Judiciary Committee members with law practices, Banking and Currency Committee members who own bank stock and sit on bank boards might take notice.

On the political side, institution-building is proceeding as well. TANU, the nation's political party, reaches to the grass roots, even the bush roots. There are party cells at the village and sub-village level. And if one deplores a one-party system, he should understand that there is full democracy within the party. At the last election, some 60 per cent of Parliament, including a number of President Nyerere's key ministers, were turned out by voters who thought they weren't keeping the village fences mended well enough. (He was able to re-appoint a few of the Ministers to the Cabinet through his authority to put a limited number of non-Parliament members in the government.) And the Tanzanians are fond of poking fun at Western preconceptions by saying that the British are so rigid about a two-party system that when there is one party they call it a dictatorship, and when there are three parties they call it anarchy.

Quite an extensive effort at rural economic development has gone forward. An early rural resettlement program did not work out well—it placed in farm settlements some city people who thought they could strike it rich and go back to the city, and who were bitterly disappointed. But experimentation has gone on with various forms of cooperatives and various mixes of crops, and one American student of the scene now pronounces it "pretty solid."

The same expert, comparing Kenya's and Tanzania's approaches generally, says the Tanzanians have experimented much more, and have done far more "in the direction of truly indigenous operations." Some of Tanzania's

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independent approach is possible because it had few pre-existing outside interests in the country when independence came. But more of it is the result of the drive and genius of Julius Nyerere. He has probably the most coherent and articulate philosophy of any world leader today, and he explains it to his people as he tries to move the country along. Not long after he became Chief of State following independence, he resigned for a year and went around among the people to learn what they wanted. It was a tremendous personal political gamble, but it worked. The nation's unique, anti-corruption program stems from Nyerere's Arusha Declaration of January, 1967—he was determined not to have his officials living off the misery of others, determined not to let individual greed get in the way of building the nation. His and TANU's philosophy and program are also articulated through a party training school, to which groups of local party officials, civil servants, and army and police personnel come, in groups of about 100, for 13 weeks at a time to learn techniques of administration as well as TANU-Nyerere theory. The course includes the nuts and bolts of local government, bookkeeping, and community development, as well as the theory and practice of Nyerere's African socialism.

A couple of years ago, Nyerere was faced with a student revolt against national service. Since university students are the most privileged class in the country, he was enraged. When almost 400 of them marched to his offices, he had them admitted to the courtyard, then had the gates shut behind them. "You," he said to them, "are like a man who is sent out by a starving village with its last pennies to get food, and does not return. For what it costs the people to educate each of you, they could be educating 270 children in the first grade." Then, to emphasize his point about privilege, he announced that he was cutting his own salary by 20 per cent, and the salaries of other government officials by up to 10 per cent. When he was finished, he expelled all of the protesters from the university, including medical and technical students badly needed for the development of the nation. They were granted amnesty a year later, but Nyerere had demonstrated just how firmly he would stand by the principles he had articulated.

Nyerere has studiously avoided the monument-building syndrome with which so many leaders of developing nations are afflicted. Dar-es-Salaam is a rather old, shabby, sleepy-looking city which does not stand out in any obvious contrast to the rest of the nation. Parliament does not even have a building of its own in which to meet. The only "monument" is the beautiful, modern university situated on hills overlooking the city—hence Nyerere's special sensitivity about the privileged status of the university student.

One reason why Americans know so little about all of this lies in the nature of some of the journalism they are exposed to. I was appalled to pick up *Time* one day and find Nyerere described as "an unabashed admirer of Mao Tse-tung, ...[who] has decreed that Tanzania shall copy Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its rejection of all things foreign." There then followed a silly article about a controversy over mini-skirts in Tanzania, which concluded by irrelevantly making fun of Nyerere's austerity and anti-corruption program as "sackcloth socialism." All I could figure out was that if you act as if you don't want outside people running your country, you are a Mao-lover, and if you try to discourage the use of Mercedes-Benzes in your government (the *Time* man specifically made fun of the

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Mercedes-Benz policy), you are an anti-capitalist fink. The whole story was foolish, and the shame of it was that there were so many worthwhile things *Time* could have used the space for.

Of course there are reasons why the *Time* man had his mind set the way he did. Those reasons stem from a couple of American policy lapses in recent years. First, it should be said that there is very little that is newsworthy about our foreign policy in Kenya, other than the fact that our former Ambassador wrote an indiscreet book which made the Kenyans exceedingly angry. But we have basically been nice to the Kenyans all along. At the beginning, some people in the State Department were worried about Kenyatta—they called him a "leader into darkness" (no pun intended, I think). But he welcomed foreign investment and nothing Communist happened there, so there was never any particular reason for us to get upset.

As for Tanzania, we started out liking them a lot and they liked us. President Nyerere visited President Kennedy during 1963, and they got along famously. Those were the days of Soapy Williams and Wayne Fredericks, both of whom cared a lot about Africa and were well liked in the newly independent black African countries, to which they travelled a good deal.

Then came Zanzibar. Britain gave Zanzibar its independence in December, 1963, and put the government in the hands of the Arab minority. It was only a matter of time before the black majority would turn the Arabs out. In fact, it took one month. When the take-over occurred, many Communist-finders found a sinister Communist plot in it. At about this time, army mutinies occurred in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and the leaders of all three countries pleaded with the West to recognize the new regime in Zanzibar in order to help restore stability. Britain's Duncan Sandys, having been shown to be very dumb for trying to put a minority in power, refused to recognize the new government. The rest of the West followed suit. Soon the East Germans, the Russians, and the Cubans were all over the island. To stop what was happening, Nyerere took it on himself to form a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar during the spring of 1964. That was when he began to appear as a sinister figure in the American press. Our relationship with Nyerere improved again later, but the damage had been done to his public image in America.

Another, similar example: the Tan-Zam railroad. For a number of years Nyerere and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia have wanted to build a railroad from the copper mines of landlocked Zambia to the Tanzanian coast. They tried repeatedly to interest the West in construction and financing of the railroad and were turned down cold. Then the Chinese came in with the offer of an interest-free loan to survey the line of rail. Nyerere and Kaunda accepted. People in the United States said, look, they're accepting Chinese aid; they're going Communist. The American government probably didn't think this, but its policy contributed to other people thinking it, like the man from *Time*.

Now American policy in East Africa—after our warm embrace of the newly independent nations in the early 1960's ("we worked at it and listened to them," says one former diplomat)—has deteriorated into indifference punctuated by mistakes like the ones I have mentioned. Fortunately, we have had able, sensitive ambassadors in both Kenya and Tanzania, but there hasn't been any White House interest to speak of since 1963. Of course President Kennedy had a special rapport. His Senate speech on Algeria is a legend in Africa, and he

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inspired a respect and affection in nearly all the developing nations, which no American leader since, except Robert Kennedy, has been able to approach. Then, too, Vietnam has taken a heavy toll. It has unduly concentrated our energies in one small part of the world, and it has poisoned our relationships with dozens of small countries all over the third world. To them, our involvement there is what they fought against and freed themselves of when they gained their independence. They can hardly trust us while we fight such a war—and are unlikely to for a long time to come. Incredible damage has been done to our position throughout the developing world in just half a decade. The only exception to this is a handful of countries in Southeast Asia, and even in those countries there is substantial feeling that we didn't have to go to the point of fighting a land war with 500,000 troops to protect their interests.

So we are at a stand-off in countries like Kenya and Tanzania. They don't want to have too much to do with us, and there isn't much we can do for them. Our foreign aid program was always tiny in East Africa—$15 to $20 million a year, on the average, in the three countries (including Uganda) combined. It continues at about that level, and consists primarily of technical assistance, teacher training, and the like. The only important capital project is a regional road in Western Tanzania. The Peace Corps continues in Kenya, but in Tanzania, where Nyerere is much more insistent about doing things his own way, the ups and downs of our policy have strengthened his resolve to be independent, and the Peace Corps is now almost totally out of business. From having 400 volunteers—and the enthusiastic support of Nyerere—at its peak, it is now down to eight. The Peace Corps people themselves have mixed feelings about the decline, because they deeply respect Nyerere's desire to develop his country without outside interference—whether it be American, Chinese, or Russian.

Our policy now is no policy, except that Nyerere is held in special respect by most of our diplomats who have responsibility in the area. The Kenyans and Tanzanians would all like to have Wayne Fredericks back, but if we are not going to have that kind of special energy and effort and sensitivity, then no policy is probably the best policy. Until the war is removed from the world's consciousness, there may be little we can do with any conspicuous success in the third world anyway. We can send good ambassadors, as we did in Glenn Ferguson (Kenya) and John Burns (Tanzania), and they can maintain good personal relationships with the host governments, but there isn't much we can do to reach large numbers of the people. This is especially true when Congress is in the process of mindlessly destroying foreign aid, which, bad as it has been, has still been a force of positive value on our behalf. Thus it might well be said that, under the circumstances, the countries where we have "low" visibility—Tanzania, Indonesia, Hungary, to name three—are the countries where our foreign policy is most successful. Not incidentally, all three of those countries impose a ceiling on the size of our embassy staff.

The effect of the war on our relationships with East Africa, and really with black Africa generally, is unfortunate in another respect. In a time of racial crisis in America—of serious, unmet black demands and inadequate, even repressive, white response—we would do well, just in our own self-interest, to be nurturing black self-respect in America by embracing black nations abroad. Still, even if we have painted ourselves into a corner from which we

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cannot now reach out to black Africa, we can find out whether what is going on in Kenya and Tanzania teaches us anything about our problems at home. I think it does.

In a sense, we have the same development choices in the ghetto as do emerging nations. Of course the first hurdle in America is to choose to do something rather than nothing. But once over that, we can either emphasize a straight-out approach of white capital giving jobs to blacks and getting the profit from their labor, which we might call, very loosely, the Kenya model; or we can emphasize the building of new institutions, both economic and social, in the ghetto, controlled by the community, which we might call, again very very loosely, the Tanzania model. The analogy is weak, to be sure, but there are some lessons. For just as I believe that Kenya will not succeed as a nation unless it concentrates more on the leveling of income disparities and the building of institutions, so I think we will perpetuate our problems in America if we do not couple the provision of jobs with a profusion of other programs which recognize the need for the building of black identity.

There, perhaps, the analogy stops. For the fact is that in America we must pursue both approaches. There will never be enough good jobs for the unemployed and underemployed of our nation unless there is a massive infusion of funds from outside, both government and private. If we left the black community to fend for itself, "Tanzania-style," we would not only foster separatism but it would be separatism at a very low economic level. On the other hand, we must also come to recognize that independent black development—black power, if you will—may be the only long-range road to a truly open society in America.

With the "black identity" sense which Nyerere projects, his nation seems to have a better relationship with its white fellow citizens than do his neighbors in Kenya, whom the whites still too often treat condescendingly and paternalistically. It is interesting that Kenya has felt the need to harass its Asian shopkeeping minority, making it uncomfortable for those who did not choose Kenyan citizenship to stay in the country. There are many reasons for this, but at least one seemed to me to be a desire to take the focus off the exploitation which characterizes too much of the black-white relationship. Tanzania has engaged in no such behavior toward its Asian minority. Black identity, I am saying, is dignity and self-respect and the basis for a healthy relation with the white man. And black economic security is the ticket to buying one's way into an integrated America.

Therefore, if the black community can control the process of rebuilding the ghetto, if it can make the plans and build homes and schools and clinics with its own labor, if it can hold the schools and hospitals accountable for the quality of their product, if it can participate in the ownership of new business and enterprise—if it can do all of these things, it can develop the badge of ownership of a full place in American society. That, in some sense, is what I think Tanzania teaches us. These things will not end white racism by themselves—we must also look to that—but they will erode the hostile, condescending mentality which now corrodes relations between the races.

Tanzania is therefore instructive to us in many ways. But the finest application of Tanzanian ideas in America would be to have the kind of leadership here which Julius Nyerere is providing there. When I was there, Lyndon Johnson was still President here, and I proposed a Presidential exchange program. There weren't any takers, but I think I'll revive the idea anyway. ■

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Obiter Dicta

Marlboro Country Woodshed

Representative Frank A. Stubblefield (D-Ky.): Mr. Speaker, a distinguished committee of the House of Representatives is now deliberating the difficult and controversial question of whether cigarette smoking is dangerous to health. But I have made up my mind. I am convinced that anti-smoking pressure is dangerous to the health of this Congress.

I am not being flippant. The threat of the constitutional lawmaking function of this body is real. It is particularly galling that it comes from two regulatory agencies which are the very creatures of Congress itself.

Not content to wait for the House to complete its decision-making, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission have served notice that they will act against cigarette advertising. The FCC intends to ban all cigarette advertising from radio and television. The FTC proposes to force every cigarette advertisement to carry a warning far harsher than any yet put forward.

Mr. Speaker, the two regulatory agencies are in effect holding a gun to Congress and saying, "Do it our way, or else." The overwhelming majority of Members denounce the violent tactics and non-negotiable demands of student radicals on campuses across the Nation. But I ask, are the FTC and FCC pressure tactics any different? I submit they are not. I submit that the breakdown of constitutional processes and traditional practices is not confined to the college campus or the ghetto streets.

I submit that the two regulatory agencies are behaving with the same disregard for lawful and orderly processes as student radicals and street-corner militants. It is unseemly behavior for a group of beardless, middle-aged commissioners. And I think it is high time for this Congress to exercise some parental discipline on its offspring. A trip to the woodshed may be definitely in order.

Dissenters from Dissent

Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) [on April 3, 1969, two months prior to the President's Air Force Academy speech]: The dissenters from dissent have taken up arms again, and, as before, it is not the right of dissent that is objected to, but the exercise of that right. Criticism is fine, we are told—the very stuff of democracy, a blessing of liberty, the true source of our strength—but, as the editorialists intone, it has got to be "responsible" dissent—"responsible" in time, "responsible" in place, "responsible" in form.

That is where all the dissenting about dissent begins. Applied to public criticisms of foreign policy, the term "responsible" usually turns out to mean: some other time, some other place, and some totally different form.

Take this matter of timing. When I criticized the Johnson Administration for its intervention in the Dominican Republic, I was criticized not only for the "aid and comfort" I was alleged to be giving to some unnamed enemy, but also because I had waited until after the crisis had abated, with the result—so said my critics—that my observations were "gratuitous" and "irrelevant." Thus enlightened, I did not wait for the Vietnam war to end before revealing my objections to it, and for that I—and many other war critics—became targets for a rich array of epithets, among which "demagoguery" and "irresponsibility" are among the more charitable. What is a dissenter to conclude except that, in the minds of the dissenters from dissent, the only time when criticism is "responsible" is some other time?

...It is all very puzzling. "Responsibility," it seems, means silent acquiescence in a policy which you deplore, while "courage" seems to connote an undiscriminating, though highly entertaining, bellicosity. Lacking more reliable guidelines for the discharge of his responsibilities, what can a politician do except to rely on his own fallible judgment? ■

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Behind the Scenes...

AND UNDER THE RUG

by Howard E. Shuman

Last December, the Douglas Commission completed a two-year study of urban problems which has since been called "the most exhaustive of its kind ever undertaken for the federal government." By almost any standard—but certainly by that of weight and volume—the description was apt. In mimeographed form, the Commission's final report, *Building the American City*, was so mammoth that the Commission furnished reporters with shopping bags in which to lug it away. Even in published form, it would put James Michener to shame: the report runs to 502 large, double-column pages. More important, the Presidentially appointed group, formally called the National Commission on Urban Problems, delved deeply into its work and came up with revelations that could be extremely useful in fashioning America's urban destiny.

While the hearings, studies, and



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final report are now public, little has thus far been revealed concerning the Commission's formation or the misleading promises, defensive reactions, and hostility within the Johnson Administration that characterized its two-year charter.

Genesis

One day in late November, 1966, Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano called at the Old Senate Office Building to talk with Senator Paul H. Douglas. The Senator was licking his wounds at the time. Earlier in the month he had lost his race for a fourth term when a coalition of negative events and a young and glamorous opponent, Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), combined to defeat him.

Califano urged Douglas to head a Presidential Commission that President Johnson had proposed in both his 1965 message on the cities and in his 1966 Syracuse speech. The Commission, Califano said, would examine urban problems, with emphasis on housing and community life as well as such mundane topics as building codes, zoning, and taxation.

Although the catastrophic 1967 riots were yet to come, this was a time when the sickness of cities was nonetheless approaching the top of the nation's domestic agenda. The Johnson Administration seemed to feel that it would be a considerable coup to get a man of Paul Douglas's knowledge and stature to head a Commission on Urban Problems. The Senator had managed the landmark 1949 Housing Act in the Senate; he had been the second-ranking member of the Senate Banking Committee, which handled housing legislation; he had introduced the original Model Cities bill; and he had been involved in every major piece of housing legislation for over 18 years.

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A few days later, in my role as the Senator's administrative assistant, I looked up the legislative authority for the Commission. To my surprise, I found that the 1965 Housing Act authorized a "committee" under the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development—not a "Commission" reporting directly to the President. The sum of $1.5 million had been appropriated to carry out its work.

I relayed my findings to Senator Douglas and urged him to turn down Califano's proposal unless: (1) the Senator were to head a Commission, rather than a "committee;" (2) the Commission would be independent of HUD and report directly to the President; and (3) the Commission's charter clearly included housing and urban affairs, as well as the narrower topics of codes, zoning, and taxation. The Senator agreed. He dispatched me to the White House to negotiate the points.

Both Larry Levinson, Califano's agent, and Under Secretary of HUD Robert C. Wood greeted the conditions with favor and even enthusiasm. This was not surprising. Wood himself had chaired a 1964 task force which had proposed a new Hoover Commission to look at ways to redesign the government to meet problems brought on by the "urban dynamic." And the President had said publicly, only a few months earlier, that he would appoint a "Commission" of distinguished citizens to study urban affairs. For these and other reasons, the White House accepted the Senator's conditions with alacrity.

Although we did not know it at the time, this was not the case with Secretary Robert C. Weaver and the HUD bureaucracy. In fact, HUD had gone to great and devious lengths to avoid just such a Commission as the President had originally proposed. When the President issued his 1965 housing message calling for a Commission, the HUD legal experts quietly downgraded it by writing legislation that would establish nothing more than a "committee" under the thumb of the Secretary. This had been done with the Secretary's approval.

After the White House staff agreed with our proposal, Levinson, some other White House staff assistants, and I jointly drafted a press release announcing the Commission and its broad objectives. Then we worked it over again into what was to be the final version of the release. In the meantime, Senator Douglas sought direct confirmation of the understanding from the President. In a phone conversation between the Senator and the President, Mr. Johnson offered no objection to Douglas's conditions.

The White House agreed to the Senator's request that a woman, a Negro, and some academic types—then the neglected minorities—be represented on the Commission. All parties also agreed that the formation of "The Commission on the Problems of the American City" as a valuable "new addition" to a government-wide effort to "...not only avert the growing deterioration of our central cities, but to bring about an urban renaissance" would be announced before the Christmas holidays so that Senator Douglas could get the Commission underway before leaving on a short vacation after a crowded and tumultuous year.

Time passed from late November, to early December, and on through the Christmas holidays. No announcement. Finally, the Senator left Washington for his much-needed vacation.

In early January, I visited Secretary Weaver to discuss the Commission's organization. With a frantic wave of his hand, he urged me to work on the arrangements at home and to stay out of sight. If I occupied a spot either at HUD or at the Executive Office Building, he said, word of the still-

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unannounced Commission might leak out. He was insistent and highly nervous about this. I thought at the time that the Secretary was the most insecure public figure that I had ever met. (It was only later that I learned of the reasons for his agitated state: he had recently undergone a Presidential tongue-lashing over his inept showing before the Ribicoff Committee, and the White House had just killed his embryonic Comsat housing proposal because word about it leaked out prematurely.)

Late in the afternoon on January 12, Levinson called me—not, as I expected, to say that the announcement was imminent, but to say that it had been made. I scurried over and picked up a copy of the release, which the White House had unobtrusively issued at five o'clock on a Friday afternoon, along with a handful of minor appointments. As any reporter knows, this is the least favorable time and day for news to be announced.

But even worse, I found that the language in the release was a far cry from what all parties had agreed to. It assigned the Commission only a two-fold charter:

"First; to work with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and conduct a penetrating review of zoning, housing, and building codes, taxation, and development standards....

"Second; to recommend the solutions, particularly those ways in which the effort of the Federal Government, private industry, and local communities can be marshalled to increase the supply of low-cost decent housing."

What should we do? Should we go along with the announcement or withdraw from the whole affair? The agreement had been violated, but the release did include the important issue of how to provide an abundance of housing for low-income families. Both White House assistant Levinson and Under Secretary Wood claimed that the change was a formality; its sole intention was to keep the Commission's functions technically in harmony with the legislation. They explained that the President had, in fact, established a Commission which was to work *with* but not *under*, the Secretary of HUD, but which was to report to Mr. Johnson.

The Senator was in the Caribbean at the time and not immediately available. After consulting briefly with trusted friends, I decided against making a public objection to our revised charter. (I had been appointed executive director of the Commission.) Our independence seemed secure enough so that, given continuing White House support, I felt we could function as independently as a Commission should.

Thus, the Commission's birth was not a happy event, or even a very public one. There was no Oval Room pageantry, no dispensing of Presidential ballpoints, and only minor mention in the few newspapers which carried the announcement at all. For months afterward, old friends asked what had become of us. At times we felt like former Russian political figures, references to whom had been expunged from all public records.

Helmsmanship

Larry Levinson's parting shot as I left the White House that evening in January, 1967, had been: "If you have any trouble with those HUD bureaucrats, just let us know."

Trouble was not long in coming Secretary Weaver, who it was now clear had spent the time from early December until January 12 trying to retrieve for himself what the White House had given us, sent Douglas an insulting memo stating that the Commission "...will develop...an agreed-upon [with HUD] budget" for the Commission's operation. We knew that control of the

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purse strings was vital to our independence. We politely, but firmly, told him "no."

Weaver decreed that at least one HUD employee must attend all of our meetings. We declined to honor this as a "right," but we did agree—I now think wrongly—to "invite" a HUD representative to each of the formal Commission meetings. This was a mistake because every criticism of HUD during both our private sessions and our public hearings went to the Secretary from his inside agent.

The Secretary's memo even outlined what our general study areas were to be and specified that we should set up five study panels—one each on building codes, housing codes, zoning, taxation, and development standards. He did not even mention the real meat: housing programs and broader urban problems. In sum, his "directive" was generally unacceptable if we were to function as an independent body.

The memo died but the ensuing struggle over staff, funds, and operations continued. When the Secretary learned that Douglas was determined (with the Commission's concurrence) to embark on a series of hearings in the ghettos of 22 major cities of the country, the fur flew again. He claimed that we were exceeding our authority and purpose. But the real fact was that he feared such hearings would embarrass HUD. We went ahead with our plans. As it turned out, those sessions provided a common and unifying experience for the entire Commission: without them a unanimous and hard-hitting final report would have eluded us. In the end it was the very best thing we could have done.

The hearings infuriated Secretary Weaver and HUD. In New Haven, HUD's showcase for urban renewal, we sensed great local hostility to the program. Over $800 per capita had been spent—the highest rate in the country—but the community was seething and later erupted in a riot. Unknown to us until the end of our day of hearings there, the New Haven police had been stationed inside and outside the hall in case our hearings got out of hand. We prevented that by welcoming the views of unscheduled as well as scheduled witnesses. In fact, the "walk-in" witnesses talked with a fire and an eloquence which the others did not match.

Everywhere we went—Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, San Francisco, New York, Philadelphia, among other places—witnesses scathingly criticized the HUD and FHA bureaucracy and told of unbelievable delays in processing housing programs.

As Commissioners Richard O'Neill and Jeh Johnson wrote in the summary of the Commission's final report:

> The civil disorders of the hot summer of 1967 followed us and preceded us. We saw the ugly burned-out urban streets that were still smoldering in some places, and we sensed the tension and anxiety in communities that would erupt not too long after our being there.
>
> We could have stayed in Washington and gathered statistics, but statistics do not tell enough about a slum. One has to see and touch and smell a slum before one fully appreciates the real urgency of the problem.

As the disturbing facts emerged, the Secretary repeatedly denounced our activities to the White House and claimed that we had exceeded our scope (if not our grasp). In private conversations with Commission members, his lieutenants spoke of our efforts with a rage and fury which had to be heard to be believed. They were especially sensitive to our report on HUD's neglect of the housing needs of the large poor family.

What we found included:

1. While the 1949 Housing Act

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authorized 800,000 units of public housing to be built in six years, only two-thirds of that six-year total had been built in almost 20 years.

2. In 1967, only 30,000 public-housing units a year were being built. Of these, more than half were efficiency and one-bedroom apartments for the elderly. Much of the remainder was built in the smaller cities. In other words, virtually no housing was being built in the ghettos of the United States for the poor families—particularly poor Negro families—who needed it most.

3. The moderate-income housing program (known in the trade as the 221 (d) (3) program) authorized 45,000 units a year since its beginning in 1961. Yet it took six years to build the number of units authorized for a single year.

4. Urban renewal had destroyed 400,000 units of housing for poor people. But on the sites it had bulldozed, the program had planned to build only 20,000 public housing units, or one-twentieth the number of units destroyed.

5. When HUD claimed that the major reason for the low production of all forms of subsidized housing was the lack of sites, we established that over half the land in the urban renewal areas of the central cities had not yet been "committed" to any building whatsoever. There were sites in abundance.

In Detroit and Cleveland, for example, vast acreages were lying idle when those two cities blew up. In Detroit, hundreds of sites had been bulldozed. As a result, excessive overcrowding existed in the riot areas while the urban renewal land lay idle. Future plans provided no remedy; they called for a medical center, luxury housing, an industrial park, and athletic facilities for Wayne State University.

Unlike Governor George Romney of Michigan (now Secretary of HUD), members of our Commission did not claim that urban renewal was a cause of the Detroit riots. All our members said was that it had not helped to prevent them. But this modest and restrained claim infuriated Secretary Weaver and his urban-renewal bureaucracy when transmitted back to them by our HUD travelling informant.

6. All in all, government action had destroyed far more housing units for the poor than it had built. While about two million units of housing had been destroyed by urban renewal, highway programs, demolitions for public housing, code enforcement, and other actions, only a million units of subsidized housing had been created. Our projections—based on the present pace of construction—showed that this pattern would continue.

7. Processing time for all major programs was so slow that it strained the Commission's credulity. One-third of the completed urban-renewal projects had taken longer than nine years. Public housing routinely took three to four years to complete. The same was generally true for the moderate-income program.

8. Up until the 1967 riots, the FHA had refused to guarantee housing loans in what were called "red-lined areas" in the central cities. These areas were so named for the mythical red lines drawn on city maps by the banks, savings and loan institutions, and the FHA. The red lines embraced ghetto areas where the banks automatically refused to grant loans and the FHA automatically refused to guarantee them. Thus, the official policy of the United States was against insuring housing where it was needed most.

9. The value of government housing subsidies for the upper 20 per cent

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of income groups in the 1960's—through the deduction of property taxes and interest paid on mortgages by homeowners—was twice that of housing subsidies for the bottom 20 per cent of income groups, as measured by direct housing subsidies and welfare payments. While ignoring the poor, and especially the Negro poor, HUD and FHA had helped to provide vast opportunities for the white middle and upper classes. Here, they were a big success.

We thought the facts enumerated above were important in evolving public policies. HUD wanted them swept under the rug. But the cities were blowing up and lack of housing was a major cause.

Home Stretch

In spite of HUD's opposition, the Commission pushed ahead. By the fall of 1968, it had published five volumes of hearings, as well as individual studies on housing programs, zoning exclusions, land use, property taxes and their regressive impact, and building and housing codes. The 16 members, all private citizens, had met for more than 70 days. Attendance at meetings and hearings had been phenomenal. The final report went through four major revisions in which the Commission or its subcommittees examined it line by line. Huge portions were written by individual members as well as by key members of the staff.

During the first week of November, 1968, we sent one copy of the final draft to Secretary Weaver and one copy to the White House. Chairman Douglas then wrote Califano, requesting a time for the Commission to present its report to the President. There was no reply. Phone calls to Califano went unreturned. When called at the White House, he was "at home." When called at home, he was "in the shower." He was at home or in the shower for almost a month.

Finally, Califano agreed to meet with Douglas on December 3rd at 12 noon at the White House. Douglas cooled his heels there for more than an hour. When Califano arrived, he asked whether the report was unanimous. It was. This news apparently came as a surprise to him, since one of Secretary Weaver's themes to the White House had been that the Commission was wracked with dissension.

Douglas again requested an opportunity for the members to present the report to the President and to be thanked by him for their diligence and devotion. Califano replied that Mr. Johnson was angry about press reports of the critical studies issued previously by the Commission. According to Califano, the President became incensed every time the Commission issued one.

The Senator told Califano that the study reports were truthful. He also argued that the final report was honest and comprehensive; it was, he said, the kind of report that the President likes. Douglas was aware of the President's populist streak and visceral reaction for the poor; indeed, it was one thing they had shared in common in the 18 years since they entered the Senate together.

In what was clearly an intended slight, Califano then insisted that the report be submitted to President-elect Nixon, rather than to President Johnson. Douglas firmly told him "no." The law prescribed that it be submitted by December 31, and he had promised his former colleagues in the House and Senate that it would be released as soon as possible. Besides, he had no intention of sending it to anyone but the President of the United States. It would break the law to withhold the report until Mr. Nixon was sworn in. Douglas flatly refused to report to a

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non-President, as Califano insisted.

In fact, he told Califano, he intended to release it for Sunday, December 15.

"I can't tell the President that," Califano said.

"I don't care what you tell the President," Douglas replied. "But I am telling you. We are releasing the report."

That ended the conference.

As a hedge against any attempt at suppression, we Xeroxed a dozen copies and got them into the hands of *The Washington Post, The New York Times*, and the wire services. We also bought 2,000 mimeographed copies for immediate distribution. It was these copies—each almost a foot thick—that reporters carried away in shopping bags.

The White House made two final attempts to upstage the report's December 15 release date. The President was scheduled to dedicate some low-cost housing units in Texas on Saturday, December 14—coverage of which could have competed with release of the Commission's report in the Sunday papers. The plan called for the President to take attention away from news of the report by dedicating the units. But the President upset the applecart. Speaking extemporaneously at the dedication ceremonies, Mr. Johnson said that one of his biggest disappointments had been the government's failure to provide a decent home for all American families. His unexpected but deeply felt statement—which squared with the thrust of our findings—complemented the story of the Commission's report.

In a second attempt to upstage the Commission report, some White House staff members dusted off an unknown internal HUD report on city and suburban problems and leaked it to *The New York Times* for use on Sunday, December 15. If our report had not been in the hands of the wire services, the *Times*, and other newspapers several days in advance, this action by the White House might have knocked the story of our report off the front page and relegated it to the dustbins of history. This White House-HUD effort failed, and the Douglas report made the front page of almost every major paper in the country. The leaked "suburban" report, which the *Times* used on Page 1 along with the story of the Douglas report, is still buried in the HUD files. It has never been publicly released.

Under the Knife

The crowning blow came on December 31. Under Section 301 of the Housing Act of 1965, the Secretary of HUD was required to submit our report to Congress. By this time Secretary Weaver had left the government and Robert Wood, the Commission's early supporter, was in charge of HUD. In carrying out his legal obligations, he transmitted to Congress and the President less than half of the Commission's final report.

Wood refused to send those sections which criticized public housing (or lack of it), urban renewal, and other HUD programs. All criticisms of FHA's red-lining, the paucity of housing for the poor and the Negro poor, the lengthy delays in processing time, and the excessive demolitions ended up on the cutting-room floor. So did the 50 detailed recommendations on how to speed up and improve the programs and to build more housing for the poor. Sections on population, poverty, and race went out, as did those on the need for larger urban government units, on city neighborhood organization, and on the design and improvement of the urban environment.

Among the most glaring omissions was a detailed chapter on revenue-

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sharing. This chapter, written by Allen Manvel of the Commission's staff, proposed that federal funds by-pass the states and go directly to the larger cities. It provided a formula for channeling rewards to states and cities which made an extra fiscal effort. This chapter and its detailed recommendations were left out because the White House opposed revenue-sharing.

When I told Secretary Wood that I felt his failure to transmit the complete version of our report was a needless and hostile act that only served to demean him, he claimed that he had left out only those sections which, in his view, had gone beyond the scope of our charter. That seemed odd, coming from the man who was the first to welcome a broad authority for the Commission.

The basic problem, of course, was that the Commission worked hard and wrote an honest, full report. In massive detail, it provided the facts about the past and suggested, in equal detail, a program for the future.

Commissions are generally established to buy time on an immediate and politically tender issue—or, as someone else has said, to treat the politics of a situation rather than the situation itself. They are expected to go into seclusion and not rock the boat. They usually report many months later—after public clamor has died down—and their work gets filed with the great unread literature of the world.

But Commissions are worthwhile only if they tell the truth, act independently, and detail past mistakes in such a way that the chances of future improvement are enhanced. This goal, even when sought by an individual Commission, is almost never shared by the federal agencies whose work comes under its scrutiny. In the case of the Douglas Commission—even during the legislative drafting period—HUD tried to turn the President's proposal for a Commission reporting to him into a committee dominated by the Secretary.

These plans backfired on the Secretary and the permanent bureaucracy when Douglas insisted on an independent role. In hindsight it is clear that the Secretary saw the Commission idea as a threat. He worked from the beginning to control and thwart the Commission's inquiry and conclusions. The White House staff, originally enthusiastic, was caught between the Commission's public criticisms of HUD and Secretary Weaver's contention that those criticisms put the Administration in a bad light. Eventually, they caved in to the Secretary's importunings.

But what if they had used the Commission "...to add significantly to the momentum of our existing urban programs" and to help bring about an "urban renaissance," as those agreed-upon drafts of its charter had proposed? Instead of acting defensively about HUD's miserable track record, suppose the Secretary and the White House had welcomed the Commission's activities as a lever to jolt the FHA, to light fires under the bureaucracy, and to help transform HUD from an agency hostile to the housing needs of the poor into one which seeks to meet their legitimate housing needs?

That was perhaps too large an order for either HUD or the White House staff to accept.

But the voluminous Commission work is there. As the hearings, studies, and final report are read and acted upon, the country may yet benefit from the fierce independence of a working Commission and its energetic, intellectually honest members. Such would not have been the case if it had abjectly succumbed to HUD's pressures and accepted a role as HUD's handmaiden and apologist. That would merely have helped to perpetrate what unkind persons call the Department of No Housing (for the poor) and Urban Development.■

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The Culture of Bureaucracy:

The Cost of Cowardice:

SILENCE IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE

by William A. Bell

• In 1966, when the commitment of American ground forces in Vietnam took its greatest leap forward, criticism of U.S. policy became widespread among Foreign Service Officers, or at least among those stationed in Washington. A number of young officers, some of whom had been expressing their misgivings in private conversation, were called together at the Department for a briefing before setting out on campus recruiting trips. One of them asked the recruitment director what they should say to students who were interested in the Foreign Service but had qualms about the American role in Vietnam. The answer—in no uncertain terms—was that there is no place in the Foreign Service for persons who do not support this war. No one spoke.

• At the beginning of the Dominican rebellion in 1965, U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett declined a request to moderate the rapidly growing dispute at a time when moderate leftists were still in control of the "constitutionalist" forces. Bennett's predecessor, John Bartlow Martin, states in his book *Overtaken by Events* that Bennett, having missed this chance at conciliation, probably had little choice but to bring in the Marines.

The book fails to relate, however, a scene in which Bennett summoned a large portion of his staff and told them that he was planning to call for help. After briefly describing the situation as he saw it, Bennett made it clear that U.S. military forces, if summoned, would be ordered to thwart the attempted revolution, not just "protect U.S. lives and property." He then asked his staff if there were any alternate views or proposals. No one spoke.

• When John Bowling, a stimulating lecturer at State's Foreign Service Institute, suggested that flag desecrators were philosophically identical to the bomb-throwing anarchists of previous decades, and that draft resisters were unmanly and cowardly, not one of the Foreign Service Officers

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in his audience challenged the statement, despite Bowling's invitation to do so. After several moments of silence, Bowling himself finally felt constrained to express the other side of both positions.

If such examples lead to doubt as to whether Foreign Service Officers are capable of speaking out in a group situation, even when there is a clear invitation to do so, one can easily imagine the prevailing timidity in one-to-one conversations where there is a disparity in rank or bureaucratic authority. FSO's may proudly relate the vehemence with which they have rebuffed officers of other agencies—notably USIA and AID—but direct argument with one's superiors in State is not a generally accepted mode of conduct. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball enjoyed a reputation as a courageous devil's advocate on the subject of Vietnam, but anyone who opposed Ball's hard line *vis-à-vis* General de Gaulle had to be wary of the consequences. At least one senior officer with the temerity to play devil's advocate on this issue received word that the Under Secretary no longer desired to share the same room with him during policy discussions.

The State Department country director in Washington is the official perhaps most likely to take advantage of his colleagues' reluctance to force an issue. He tends to believe that his job—and his chances for career advancement—lies in maintaining a cordial daily relationship between the United States and Country X. He tends to turn aside any potential disturbance in this relationship, including those changes which could be in the long-run national interest. Unless he is an exceptional man, he is fearful that any such disturbance will adversely affect his reputation and career. Worse, he is probably right.

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A desk-officer prerogative particularly prone to abuse is the power to cut off the flow of outgoing reports prepared by State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which is supposed to render judgments independent of existing policy considerations. This right of suppression exists for the alleged purpose of correcting "factual inaccuracies." But intelligence reports are often timed for release at an optimum moment. When desk officers withhold clearances of such reports temporarily, it reduces the unfavorable impact of views contrary to official policy.

The intelligence section of the State Department has few operational responsibilities; hence it is viewed by many FSO's as a kind of purgatory. For example, David Nes, who had the ill grace to tell the press and the Congress that he had warned the Department of the imminence of the 1966 Arab-Israeli war while serving as chargé d'affaires in Cairo, was summarily assigned to the intelligence section until he chose to resign. A number of Foreign Service Officers in intelligence are thus more interested in returning to "policy-making" than in arguing a fresh point of view before those with whom they may soon again be working.

"The heart of the problem..."

The occupational diseases of desk and intelligence officers are, of course, only symptomatic of the personality characteristics impeding the State Department. Back in 1963, Dean Rusk told a Senate Government Operations Subcommittee that "the heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility...organization seldom gets in the way of a good man...if a man demonstrates that he is willing to make judgments and live with the results." Governor Averell Harriman has stated repeatedly that "good organizational machinery can never substitute for good people"—a disturbing thought when juxtaposed with his assertion that "regardless of the talent brought in on top, the backbone of the State Department is the Foreign Service."

Professor Chris Argyris, Chairman of Yale's Department of Administrative Sciences and a respected authority on organizational behavior, was unkind enough to write a report on "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State." After attending three long sessions with senior officers, Argyris judged the norms of personal interaction among most FSO's to be characterized by "withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and conflict; minimum interpersonal openness; mistrust of others' aggressiveness; and withdrawal from aggressiveness and fighting." In calling for a further study of the causes for such norms, Argyris suggested the distinct possibility that "the problem is primarily one of individuals who fear taking initiative, and not the system suppressing their initiative."

High-Rise Outhouse

A study like the one Argyris suggested might well begin with the Foreign Service basic training course for young men entering our diplomatic corps. In 1963, it was conducted by a senior officer whose constant (and sincerely expressed) maxim was: "Find out who Big Brother is—and knuckle under."

The usual defensive explanation for Milquetoastian behavior on the part of individual Foreign Service Officers is the promotion system. FSO's are fond of describing it as a high-rise outhouse, constructed so that each person—except for those at the very bottom—is subject to deposits from those above but can deposit in kind upon those below. Although this is hyperbole, this general view of the system is widely shared within the Department. Whether

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it is accurate or not, *belief* in its validity creates a formidable operating reality; it hardly encourages dissent with one's "superior."

A classic example occurred in Rome in the late 1950's, when an astute political officer boldly tried to convince the Embassy that the U.S. government should support the "opening to the left" in Italian politics and quietly bestow a blessing upon the proposed creation of a left-of-center government in place of the traditional conservatives. This officer pressed his views on the Ambassador and on influential U.S. officials back in Washington—at which point outhouse residents at the intermediate levels let fly with reports of "insubordination." The offender was on the brink of removal from the Foreign Service when the incoming Kennedy Administration decided to support the "opening to the left." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., saved the State Department from losing that officer, who is now highly regarded.

Despite the outhouse symbol, there has been encouraging evidence that the personnel system is a paper tiger, that it will reward the dissenting activist rather than punish him. One of the new criteria for promotion of junior men is the officer's ability to suggest or embark upon untested courses of action. Close attention is now given to screening out biased personnel reports, and efforts are being made to see that the most demanding assignments are given to the self-starters. In order to shore up this system, the personnel officer jobs in Washington are now being manned by individuals with deserved reputations for tough-mindedness. There are numerous examples of initiative being rewarded by promotion to the higher ranks, perhaps the most notable being the rapid rise of William H. Sullivan, who recently completed a long and distinguished tour as Ambassador to Laos and is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific.

No Exit

If retribution at the hands of the personnel system is something of a bogeyman, are there other reasons why Foreign Service Officers so regularly prefer discretion to valor? One might begin with a look at the personal circumstances of the older officers. They joined the Foreign Service when the bulk of new officers came from gentlemanly schools and "nice" families. Later, they saw John Foster Dulles sacrifice some of their colleagues to Senator Joseph McCarthy. Many of these men now have children of college age; they are unlikely to take risks which they (rightly or wrongly) believe could jeopardize their jobs. And they are aware of a harsh fact about the Foreign Service: it trains in skills not readily transferable to other forms of employment.

Whimsical critics of the Foreign Service have suggested that only individuals with professional degrees or independent incomes be accepted into the ranks, on the theory that such persons are less likely to worry about the risks associated with outspokenness. It has also pointed out numerous times that the toughest fighter of all—"the old crocodile," Averell Harriman—never had to lose any sleep over where his next paycheck might be coming from.

Other factors that dull the cutting edge of senior officers include the personnel rating report and the transient nature of Foreign Service assignments. The rating report, which is no longer withheld from the officer being rated, requires detailed comment on the officer's abilities and characteristics, as well as the degree to which his family is, or is not, an asset. One officer, now retired, recalls his first post abroad well. One day he puffed up three flights of

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the Consulate steps to tell a superior about an incident which had just occurred in the city. He was somewhat out of breath when he told his tale. The subsequent rating report said that the officer "does quite well, in spite of a slight speech defect." Although this is an extreme and ludicrous example, it does have its point: only the most thick-skinned officers can accept a lifetime of these reports, however ridiculous, without tending towards self-consciousness.

Smith Simpson's *Anatomy of the State Department* ascribes Foreign Service faintheartedness to the constant cycle of assignment and re-assignment, which encourages officers to think more about their future possibilities than about their present challenges. Regulations requiring automatic dismissal of those Foreign Service Officers repeatedly passed over for promotion, wise as those rules may be in some ways, create an extra measure of pressure toward conformity.

While the timorous nature of those officers who survive to seniority is perhaps understandable, younger officers often display the same attributes, and perhaps to an even greater degree. Far from brimming with ideas, most young officers are concerned almost exclusively with career advancement into areas of substantial responsibility. Given the nature of most jobs at the bottom of the ladder, this may not be surprising.

Distilled Water

One of the most promising efforts at renovating the State Department has been the Open Forum Panel, originally created as an avenue for out-of-channel policy ideas that could be passed on to the Secretary. Rusk gave this Panel his firm endorsement and sent an open letter to all posts, urging the submission of ideas. The silence was deafening.

Of the 100 or so ideas received, almost all came from the three Department bureaus whose directors had asked their subordinates to "let 1,000 flowers bloom" by noon on Friday. The remaining handful came from five or six individuals who had received no such "request" from above. The most imaginative suggestions were submitted by senior officers. Secretary Rusk met twice with the Panel and approved several of the policy suggestions. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* wrote articles praising the creation of the Panel, and CBS sent Dan Rather to do a TV news cut on the subject. But the effervescence of long-frustrated ideas within the Department remained roughly equivalent to that in a bottle of distilled water. It was curiously unrefreshing.

The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club is another hotbed of intellectual dissent. There is a fair amount of militancy in this group, but the demands are exclusively in the personnel field. The club never discusses the policy issues which younger officers might handle if given the positions to which they aspire. In pressing for higher entrance salaries for junior officers, however, JFSOC did wangle one important statistic out of administrative files: the average raw score achieved by Foreign Service applicants on the standard entrance exam has been dropping notably since 1963. This trend is particularly disturbing because it has occurred at a time when the raw test scores of applicants for just about every other program in this nation are going up rapidly.

In considering the disappointing caliber of younger officers, it is necessary to visualize what the State Department looks like to today's applicant. The pay is adequate, but it is significantly below that available in most other jobs, including the Civil Service. The first several years of employment will probably entail mostly consular

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work, which can be (and in many instances is) handled by intelligent high-school graduates. The State Department expects its employees to work closely with military officials and employees of the CIA, with whatever hang-up that may entail for many college students. But more important for recruiting, of course, few college students are at ease with the Department's rationale for fighting a cruel war in Southeast Asia. In addition, the style of the present Administration is notably less exciting than that of its predecessors; the most important foreign policy responsibilities seem to have moved to the White House for good; and domestic problems are rising to the top of the nation's priority list anyway.

Thus, it seems likely that the State Department has already screened itself out of consideration by many, if not most, of today's brightest college graduates.

The second category consists of beneficiaries of the State Department.

Of those entering the Foreign Service, most fall into one of three categories. The first—and probably the largest—category is that of patriotic expatriates. Many former Peace Corps volunteers see the Foreign Service as a way of continuing to lead interesting lives abroad. Many Americans with foreign wives find the Foreign Service a means of avoiding the cultural and marital strains of forcing total "Americanization" upon their wives and families. There is also a large number of Foreign Service personnel who get great satisfaction out of eating at foreign restaurants, shopping at foreign stores, employing inexpensive household servants, drinking tax-free liquor, and patronizing the natives of their post of assignment—all while paying off a mortgage on a house in Washington, which they can rent out at a profit and live in themselves during assignments back home.

policy of juggling entrance standards in order to improve the geographic and racial mix of the officer corps. While the ends may justify the means in this instance, the side effect is to employ persons inclined to extreme caution within a system which has, after all, done them a favor.

The third type of entrant into the Foreign Service is the one with a consuming interest in foreign affairs. George Kennan is possibly the most outstanding example of such a person, although there are other such dedicated and brilliant Soviet specialists, plus numerous experts in various geographic areas and functional fields. If the Foreign Service brings forth 10 such men a year, the shortcomings of the remaining officers can perhaps be disregarded.

Tired New Blood

But the clammy atmosphere of the Foreign Service, combined with the highly responsible positions available outside (some in foreign affairs), acts to skim off many, if not most, of the most promising younger officers. The February, 1968, issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* contained an article entitled, "Is the Foreign Service Losing Its Best Young Officers?" The conclusion to be drawn from it is: "Probably so."

The three authors of this article (one of whom has since resigned himself) reviewed 57 questionnaires filled out by men who had entered the Foreign Service between 1960 and 1965 and had subsequently resigned. The authors found that the resignee differs in two ways from his colleagues still in the Service: "He is more likely to have a graduate degree, and...he is also more likely to be regarded as an above average officer by his superiors." There is, in the authors' view, "very strong evidence that the resignees do indeed represent the high-performance young men

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which the Service strives to attract and retain." The attrition rate for FSO's during their first five years of service has lately been about 20 per cent and is now rumored to be rising markedly.

Even more distressing, perhaps, are the reasons given for resigning. Low pay and dissatisfaction with supervisors were listed as of only marginal importance. Over half the respondents, however, gave as their primary reason for leaving either lack of challenge, or lack of long-range prospects for jobs of significant responsibility. Most of them listed "dissatisfaction with the personnel system" as an element, although not a major one, in their decision to resign. Of those who did mention personnel, the largest proportion (39 per cent) checked "pressure to conform" as a specific complaint.

This information inevitably raises some questions and doubts about those who remain in the Service. Are they more dedicated? Less employable elsewhere? More tolerant of mediocrity? Or mediocre themselves?

Prescriptions

Unfortunately, cures for the Department of State have traditionally proved more debilitating than the original illness. However, this time around Secretary of State William P. Rogers has taken an important and constructive first step toward reform by calling for a Department open to innovation and debate. And Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson has expressed uncommon interest in adjusting the machinery. These words must be followed up by specific measures.

The previously-mentioned Open Forum Panel has now shifted its attention to contacts outside the State Department, having found so little food for thought within. The Secretary should support the Panel in this role, if for no other reason than to display to the public and to prospective Foreign Service applicants a number of bright and aggressive young officers who believe that the Department can be a Better Place. The Panel should also continue to promote discussion groups and projects among the various Departmental bureaus. These sessions may not change policies overnight, but they are already breaking down inhibitions.

Dissenting opinions should be encouraged as a matter of official policy. Officers who have in the past written such opinions from posts abroad (including a report which predicted North Korea's invasion of South Korea) have found, upon arrival back in Washington, that their reports were suppressed or disparaged. Such forms of information management should perhaps be made a punishable offense.

In the long run, however, the Department of State will be a creative institution only if it directs its recruitment efforts toward men with proven leadership qualities. It will not be enough just to attract such officers; they must be given substantive jobs, not consular work, if they are to be retained.

Intellectual courage is hardly the sole criterion in seeking a Foreign Service prepared to promote our national interest. But given the various influences pervading foreign policy, such courage may be a prerequisite. During the McCarthy era, one Foreign Service Officer, in charge of a small consulate, received firm orders from Washington to remove certain works of literature from the shelves of the post library. Although outraged, the FSO weighed his personal interest against the national interest. He decided to comply with the order—against the advice of none other than an Air Force officer, his military aide. While superficially surprising, the implications are ominous. ■

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The Culture of Bureaucracy:

The Cost of Courage:

THE PENTAGON'S LONELIEST MAN

by Barbara Newman

The career of A. E. Fitzgerald is in jeopardy. His sin: zeal and honesty in performing his job as a high-ranking Air Force management expert. In most worlds, efficiency experts who ferret out waste and sloppiness are rewarded. But Fitzgerald works at the Pentagon, where a cost expert can come upon hard times, especially if he tells the truth to Congress.

No one in Washington had ever heard of A. E. (for Arthur Ernest) Fitzgerald until last November. That was when he broke the news to a Congressional committee that the giant C-5A military cargo plane would cost the government almost $2 billion more than it said in the original contract price negotiated with Lockheed. To the discomfiture of his superiors, Ernie Fitzgerald has been invited to appear at a number of hearings since that time. And one day in June, 15 minutes before he was scheduled to discuss the costs of the Minuteman program before a joint committee of Congress, the Air Force ordered him not to testify. Although the Air Force reversed itself the next day—after the committee chairman, Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), complained to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—the story accurately suggests that the Air Force hierarchy would like nothing better than to have Fitzgerald leave the Pentagon forever.

What sort of man would you expect a man like A. E. Fitzgerald to be? Perhaps an anti-military zealot who infiltrated the Pentagon. Or a liberal abstractionist concerned about an imbalance between the military and domestic budget. Or a foe of the military-industrial complex. But he is none of these. He is, in his own words, "a parsimonious hawk." He does not suggest that the role of the military in Ameri-

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can life is too large or that we are not paying enough attention to the central cities. Those are not the issues that engage him.

Fitzgerald is a zealot in another direction: he can't stand the sight of waste. It appalls him. So do inefficiency, slack procedures, and incompetence. And now he finds himself the loneliest man at the Pentagon because he has accused the procurement hierarchy of all these things (and helpfully documented it with chapters and verses).

Looked at another way, A. E. Fitzgerald is a GS-17 bureaucrat with a salary approaching $30,000. His title sounds long and anonymous: he is Deputy for Management Systems in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management). He is 43 years old. He is a self-made man. He grew up in a part of Alabama where one had to work hard to make a living. He went to the University of Alabama on the GI Bill after World War II. Hard work is still his habit, although the Air Force has isolated him from major responsibility for the last eight months.

Before he went to work for the Air Force in 1965, he was president of Performance Technology Corporation, a tough cost-efficiency organization that has done extensive work for the Pentagon. A study it conducted on the engines for the F-111 fighter-bomber recommended that contract costs be cut by 50 per cent. Its evaluation of the Minuteman II program found that costs were too high and that the Minuteman's reliability was in doubt. The Air Force ignored the findings on the Minuteman, only to discover later that (a) it had cost $4 billion more than the Air Force had told Congress it would cost and (b) the guidance system had turned out to be unreliable.

Fitzgerald, after participating in his company's study of the Minuteman guidance system, concluded that if someone relatively high up in the Pentagon had known about cost control and performance standards the Minuteman situation might not have occurred. In the fall of 1965, at the invitation of Leonard Marks, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management, Fitzgerald agreed to join the Air Force staff. He took a substantial salary cut to do so; but he felt it was important work that he could do well.

He became actively engaged in promoting more efficient management techniques in Air Force procurement almost as soon as he arrived on the job. Some of his superiors in the Air Force hierarchy did not appreciate Fitzgerald's efforts, particularly in the area of cost control. But Fitzgerald is the kind of man who bears up well under official displeasure when he is convinced that he is right.

He thought he was right last November, when he appeared for the first time before the Economy in Government Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, headed by Proxmire. His testimony then—to the effect that the C-5A would cost the government $5.2 billion, rather than the $3.4 billion anticipated in the contract—set off the first significant stir over inefficiency in military procurement procedures.

If, as seems clear, his revelation helped to stimulate debate on a broad range of issues involving the military, it also caused the Air Force to start its program of massive retaliation against Fitzgerald. He was stripped of his primary duties—overseeing cost reports on the major weapons systems and working on performance standards for contractors; his transfer to tenured civil-service status, promised two months prior to his Congressional appearance, fell by the wayside; President Johnson's Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, asked for a memo out-

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lining the different ways in which he could fire Fitzgerald. In the long months since November, Fitzgerald has retained his title but lost his principal functions. He would be long gone from the Pentagon by now if it were not for the array of Senators and Congressmen—from all over the political spectrum—who are convinced of Fitzgerald's value as an efficiency expert and who believe that the $2 billion misunderstanding over the C-5A deserved the public airing it got.

The C-5A Story

The C-5A is the largest airplane ever built. It is almost as long as a football field, and it is designed to carry great amounts of military equipment.

Its complex history, difficult even now to reconstruct, can begin, for the purposes of this article, when the government signed the C-5A contract with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in October, 1965, about a month after Fitzgerald went to work at the Pentagon.

This was the first major defense contract to embrace what is known as the "total package" procurement concept. Under the old method, contractors would compete with one another during the research-and-development phase, after which the Pentagon would choose the prototype it liked best and sign a production contract with the company that produced it. At that point, the company would become a "sole source" supplier of the new product. Thus, a contractor would set a low price for research and development, in hopes of competing successfully for the "sole source" production contract. But any contractor who ultimately won a sole-source contract could, in the absence of competition, set high prices for production, partly to recoup any losses he may have suffered on the R and D phase.

Total package procurement was the brainchild of Robert H. Charles, who was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Logistics. He presented it as a way for the government to save money by forcing a contractor to put a total fixed price for all of the stages involved in developing and producing a new article of hardwar. Secretary of Defense McNamara described it as "a damn good contract."

And it well might have been, if it had gone according to the original plan. But mysteriously and suddenly a new element—which Fitzgerald calls "the dark at the top of the stairs"—entered into the picture. This was a so-called repricing formula which completely violated the "total packaging" principle behind the new-style contract.

When the government signed the contract with Lockheed, it committed itself to buying only the first 58 planes, known as the C-5A. If the government decided not to go ahead with a second order of 57 planes (C-5B), its liability could not exceed the ceiling price of the original contract. The repricing formula—so mysteriously found in some copies of the contract later on—would allow Lockheed to recoup whatever losses it may have suffered on the C-5A by getting higher prices on the C-5B's.

It is particularly curious that the repricing formula did not appear in any of the copies of the Lockheed contract distributed to the Air Force Financial Management staff, where Fitzgerald works. Although the evidence thus far indicates that Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert N. Anthony were not informed of the formula, it seems clear that Charles, who devised the new total-packaging contracting method, must have known about it.

He was obviously concerned about Lockheed's welfare. When the Air Force informed Lockheed in early 1967 that its contract might be terminated unless it remedied technical de-

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ficiencies in the C-5A, Charles sent a 13-page memo to Secretary Brown indicating how unfair this was to Lockheed when the company was about to float a $125 million debenture in the market.

More dark appeared at the top of the stairs through alteration of official records of the program's costs. These involved what are known as "overruns"—the amount by which a government contract exceeds the target, or hoped-for, price. Such expenses cannot exceed the contract limitation, but when they occur the government shares the cost with the contractor.

In June of last year, Fitzgerald was surprised to discover that the overruns on the Lockheed contract had disappeared from the official records. He asked for an internal audit and received it in October. It said that the overruns had been deleted at the order of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Charles and Assistant Secretary of Defense Anthony. Anthony has subsequently said that he had nothing to do with it. Charles has acknowledged that it was done on his orders and has insisted that it was justified. The Department of Justice is exploring the legality of deleting cost overruns to determine whether it amounts to falsification of government records, a criminal offense.

In a vastly oversimplified way, these are some of the facts that Fitzgerald shared with the Proxmire committee last fall. Early this year, in the last week of the Johnson Administration, the Air Force gave Lockheed the go-ahead on the second batch of planes (the C-5B's), even though the cost estimate had risen from $22 million per plane to $40 million per plane. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, however, contends that the Air Force exceeded its discretion in placing the order, since no funds have been appropriated for the second batch.

Fitzgerald's Future

A. E. Fitzgerald has not lost any zeal in the course of his various encounters. He feels strongly about "the lack of climate for cost control" at the Pentagon. In his view, the system there does not reward efficiency or punish waste—*in fact, the opposite is more often true.*

He also believes that most military men should not be involved in procurement; because they lack expertise in costing, they are too often putty in the hands of canny company negotiators. Another reason that some tend to be malleable, he feels, is that the Pentagon has an "up or out" policy which forces officers to retire if they are passed over twice for promotion. Thus, if an officer faces the prospect of such forced retirement—or even of regular retirement—he has little incentive to be tough with potential employers on the other side of the negotiating table.

For telling it like it is, A. E. Fitzgerald has been stripped of his duties and assigned to investigate the cost overrun on a 20-lane bowling alley in Thailand (his first question: "Why was it built?"). Whether the Nixon Administration restores him to effectiveness by re-involving him in cost and performance studies of major weapons systems will indicate the depth of Secretary Laird's public assertion that he intends to get tough with contractors and cut costs. Not long ago, at Laird's invitation, Fitzgerald met with Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. Although both were cordial, neither Laird nor Packard indicated that Fitzgerald has any future at the Pentagon. After all, Fitzgerald has done more than any man in Washington to encourage a close look at waste in the Pentagon budget. But, like the subjects of most other profiles in courage, Fitzgerald has no regrets. He is well aware that he who makes waves may drown in them. ■

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

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Crossed Wires: CABLE TV AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

by Arthur Alpert

We conclude that one of the most promising avenues to diversity is the distribution of television to the home by means of cable.

—President Johnson's Task Force on Communications Policy, December 7, 1968

Lansford, Pennsylvania, a town of 6,000, lies in a steep valley. Just to the south, between Lansford and Philadelphia, 65 air miles away, is a 500-foot mountain. In 1949, signals beamed from Philadelphia's single television station bounced off that rise and never reached Lansford.

Bob Tarlton wanted to watch television. He also sold and repaired TV sets in neighboring towns, and he wanted to improve business. So he erected an 80-foot antenna on Summit Hill, speared the TV signal, fed it into coaxial cable, hung the cable on utility poles, and ran it down the hill into Lansford. From the cable, Tarlton ran a "drop"—a quarter-inch-thick piece of cable—to the back of local TV sets. He charged $125 for installation, plus $3 a month for the service. And television sets began to sell in Lansford.

Tarlton's was the first Community Antenna Television (CATV) system to use coaxial cable (which sets up an artificial frequency spectrum) to carry sound and pictures. His original cable could handle three TV channels. Today most CATV systems carry 12, although some of the newer ones have a 20-channel wire, and cable capacity is still growing.

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So is the industry. Almost 2,000 cable television systems operate in all 50 states and the Virgin Islands, with the number of subscribers averaging out to 1,842 per system. Gross revenues approached $250 million last year.

Coaxial cable could reshape our television broadcast system, but it is highly unlikely that it will ever produce the diversity of programming that is technologically within reach.

That is because the nation has no communications policy. What it does have is an incoherent body of responses to industry's powerful stimuli. And because the public interest is difficult to define and almost impossible to advocate effectively, cable television's potential will probably fall victim to the same action-reaction morass of decision-making that has characterized government's relationship to radio and television from the beginning.

In the earliest days of radio, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover said: "It is inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for service to be drowned in advertising chatter." Radio promptly drowned. When television got off to its first flickering start, General David Sarnoff of NBC and William S. Paley of CBS said essentially the same thing about that new medium.

Everyone knows where we are today. In 1969, television exists to turn out a product—called an audience—for delivery to its client, the advertiser. Television's function is to attract; programming is the magnet with which it is done.

If broadcasting were free enterprise, there would be no more to say. But it is a limited monopoly. Government supplies a slice of the frequency spectrum—a limited and valuable resource—at no cost. In return, the broadcaster acknowledges the government's right to regulate his industry "in the public interest, convenience and necessity."

But what is the public interest? When Congress inserted that phrase in broadcast law, nobody thought to define it. Any definition, it seems to me, should arise from the nature of our society. The U.S. is, extraordinarily and beyond dispute, pluralistic. Broadcasting in the public interest ought to reflect that pluralism if it were to do nothing else. Yet a glance at *TV Guide* makes it apparent that programming tends to be monolithic; thus, even a rudimentary definition of the public interest makes it clear that broadcasting does not, in general, serve it.

So here we are; high-capacity coaxial cable promises a brand-new ball game. But technology can only promise. Industry must exploit technology and profit thereby. And government's role is to set bounds and priorities so that the results serve public ends as well as private interests.

To understand the promise and peril of cable TV, we need to examine the three areas of decision-making—technology, industry, and government—and see how the original promise of conventional television evolved into the mass medium we have today.

Technology

The first leg of this decision-making triangle is technology, and its basic facts are that (a) over-the-air broadcasting depends on the frequency spectrum to carry sound and pictures, and (b) each VHF television channel requires a fairly broad slice of that spectrum.

Television developed in the VHF portion of the spectrum, which has room for only 13 channels. UHF, which has room for 70, is the Johnny-come-lately—the FCC did not make its initial UHF allocations until 1952. By that time, the networks had affiliated prin-

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cipally with VHF stations, and manufacturers were building sets for VHF reception only. Investors, therefore, shied away from UHF—so much so that the number of UHF stations actually declined between 1954 and 1962.

Now, all other things being equal, viewers with diverse interests will be better served if there are many channels than if there are few. It required poor planning by the Federal Communications Commission, effective lobbying by industry, and short-sightedness by the Congress to produce the current scarcity of channels. Each did its part.

The Commission compounded its original failure to develop UHF by mixing VHF and UHF in the same markets, putting the latter at a competitive disadvantage. When it tried to rectify that error, industry persuaded Congress otherwise.

In 1962, the Newton Minow FCC obtained passage of the All-Channel Receiver Law, authorizing the agency to require that all new sets be equipped to receive UHF signals. It took the FCC two more years to issue such a requirement. Thus, television sets automatically equipped with both VHF and UHF have been rolling off the assembly line for only five years.

As a result, half the TV homes in the nation now receive UHF. But to what end? UHF stations are too poor to compete. In 1967, only 44 of the 133 UHFs reported profits. Of those, 42 had a network affiliation; only two of the 89 independent UHF stations were in the black. Is it any wonder that the typical UHF station consists of a transmitter, a film projector, old situation comedies, and ancient movies?

It is theoretically possible to save UHF and strike a blow for diversity by moving *all* television into UHF range. But this won't happen because it is politically unthinkable. Or, as FCC Chairman Rosel Hyde puts it, "It is not possible to make such revolutionary or drastic changes as...might be good from a logical standpoint, under our system."

A scarcity of channels, artificial as it may be, is basic to the existing broadcast system. The second leg of the decision-making triangle is to be found in the way the television industry makes its money.

Industry

In the beginning of broadcasting, advertising was unthinkable. Even David Sarnoff assumed that the main profits of radio would come from the sale of sets. But when the glamour wore off, performers asked to be paid for going on the air. Stations recouped by permitting "indirect advertising"—through which business firms could pay for the privilege of naming programs or entertainers. Thus, the "A&P Gypsies" and "The Chase and Sanborn Hour."

AT&T, then a broadcaster, saw radio as a sort of phone booth of the air. The telephone company invited anybody to approach the microphone for a fee, and called this arrangement "toll radio." To AT&T, then, go the laurels for inventing today's commonplace: the sale of time.

Broadcasting became big business with the growth of networks, which could offer advertisers a single sale of time for a chain of stations. William S. Paley's contribution to the art was "option time," a plan that permitted CBS to sell time nationally and then instruct its affiliates when to carry it. Option time was just the beginning of a process that culminated in three powerful TV networks and 600 dependent affiliates. (Yet both the Radio Act of 1927 and Communications Act of 1934 provide for the licensing of stations, not networks. And each contains only brief reference to "chain broadcasting.")

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With the FCC unwilling or unable to stem the tide, sponsored programming pushed sustaining programs out of prime time and into the ghettos. Advertising soon dominated broadcasting.

What are the implications? Today the television advertiser wants the broadcaster to deliver as many viewers as possible to hear his message. The broadcaster's earnings depend on how many people watch. He is free to program for discrete audiences, of course, but at a risk. While "First Tuesday" of a Vladimir Horowitz concert may break even or earn money, such programs will always produce less revenue than a program aimed at everybody.

This is where the scarcity of channels intersects with the advertising leg of the triangle. Thanks to the scarcity, the viewer has little choice. And the broadcaster finds it more profitable to aim for a slice of the mass audience than to seek a minority audience.

(Given that economic logic, it is a wonder that TV broadcasters do as much programming for narrow audiences as they do. Whatever the motive, the commercial broadcaster deliberately chooses to minimize his profit each time he airs a documentary or a Horowitz concert.)

Such is the American television system: a medium in which advertising support and a limited number of channels combine, in the absence of stringent regulation, to make delivery of a mass audience synonymous with profit. Non-commercial television is a little-watched appendage.

Channels Galore

Enter cable. Since it solves the scarcity of channels, it is subversive of the old order. But its own decision-making triangle is not yet constructed. The quality of the programs we get from cable television will depend on its second leg—how the industry makes money. That question is still up in the air. A detour into the history of cable—or CATV—may help explain why.

CATV began as a complement to over-the-air television in fringe reception areas, where natural obstacles (or distance) interfered with the regular signals. This is what Bob Tarlton did in Lansford. In those days—the 1950's—CATV restricted itself to the improvement of television reception. Nobody objected. Conventional stations, in fact, often found that cable systems enlarged their coverage. The FCC decided that it had no regulatory jurisdiction.

Companies later began building "headend" facilities to tune, amplify, and boost signals in the cities, where skyscrapers and spurious radiation produce ghosts and other interference. (The improved reception is particularly dramatic on color TV, which is more susceptible to haunting.) Subscribers pay a hookup fee, usually about $10, and a monthly charge of about $5.

But this simple service began to change in the 1960's. Cable companies discovered that they could add new customers—and increase revenues—by offering subscribers additional stations as well as better reception.

How did they do this? Keep in mind that the nation has only 680 commercial television stations, counting both VHF and UHF. They are so distributed that about 100 metropolitan areas have three to five stations, several hundred smaller communities have one or two, and some have none at all. What the cable companies began to do was to reorient their antennas to provide a new service. They set up a string of microwave relay towers to bring their subscribers new stations from long distances. This brought the new stations into the sets of old subscribers who had plugged into CATV for improved reception, but it also provided a magnet

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for potential subscribers who had no reception problems but who did want greater diversity for their sets.

Howls arose from local broadcasters, for whom it is an article of faith that the Lord banished Mephistopheles to the Lower Depths after the Devil threatened to fragment His audience. Audience fragmentation means fewer viewers per station—and that means lower advertising revenues. The local broadcaster complained to the FCC that importation of distant TV signals by cable companies was unfair competition because the cable company did not pay for the programs it plucked from the air. CATV countered that the signals were in the public domain.

In February, 1966, having decided that it really wanted to regulate cable after all, the FCC backed the local broadcasters by prohibiting the importation of distant signals into the nation's 100 largest markets. These markets comprise 89 per cent of all TV homes. In order to obtain a waiver of that ban, the FCC ruled, a cable company needed to prove the impossible: that its imported programs would damage neither existing nor contemplated local stations.

The mortal combat over the freeze on CATV's expansion into the mainstream markets throws some light on how industry persuades the nation that its private interests and the public interest coincide.

At the spectre of audience fragmentation, what FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson calls the "sub-government" rose to the defense of local TV stations. That sub-government consists of the National Association of Broadcasters, the networks, the trade press, the communications bar, certain members of the FCC and its staff, and the most powerful members of the Senate and House Commerce Committees.

But cable television, having grown into an industry serving about 3,500,000 homes (6.3 per cent of the TV audience), exercised some political muscle, too. In 1965, the National Cable Television Association induced an able former FCC Chairman, Frederick W. Ford, to become its president. Then the national group and state associations set about learning the ropes in Washington and at home.

Cable companies operate under franchises granted by local government, since the companies need to string or bury their wire along city streets. As part of the strategy for obtaining franchises, they regularly promise to donate a channel or two to the municipality or its schools. They also offer free air time to worthy organizations. Many local officials were therefore happy to comply when the industry asked them for testimonials and other forms of political assistance.

N.C.T.A. saw the 1968 elections as an unusual opportunity. At least 350 cable systems in 45 states ran one or more of the Nixon and Humphrey campaign films, often replaying them. A CATV company in Greensboro, North Carolina, put every local and statewide candidate it could find on the tube. It was all free of charge.

Bill Daniels, a cable millionaire headquartered in Colorado Springs, was chairman of the Nixon fund drive in his state. Daniels set out to cultivate his Senators and Congressmen. "I've done it because it's a question of survival," he says. "And our opponents, who are the local broadcasters...for years have made it a point to get along with Congressmen and Senators. They put them on their news shows. They do everything they can to become well acquainted. We have started to do that, too."

The Great Compromise

Cable TV's lobbying against the fortified political positions of the broadcast

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industry was uphill all the way. But cable is well armed: its technology is impressive, the public subscribes, Wall Street is bullish on its prospects. Networks and local stations hedged their bets by purchasing about 32 per cent of the cable industry. The warfare slackened; cable and broadcasting opened peace talks.

Outlines of a Great Compromise appeared on May 29th of this year. The N.C.T.A. and the N.A.B., neither of them reluctant to define the public's interest for the public, agreed that adequate TV service for a market is six stations—three affiliated with the networks and three independent. The industries decided that cable TV should be permitted to import distant stations into any market with fewer than six conventional commercial stations until the community is served by that number.

They agreed that CATV will pay for both local and distant signals, the price to be determined by Congress in pending copyright legislation. That measure also would require TV stations to allow their programs to be transmitted via cable. N.C.T.A. and N.A.B. have agreed, in addition, to various exclusivity provisions designed to give special protection to broadcasters in the top 50 markets, where TV makes most of its money.

But the era of good feeling was short-lived. At a meeting in late June the N.A.B. decided that it would not go along with the tentative compromise worked out with N.C.T.A. by its negotiating committee. But even if the N.A.B. had given its stamp of approval to the compromise, the FCC might well have balked at approving it, on the grounds that it was too soft on distant signals. To see why the Commission is adamantly opposed to the importation of distant signals, we ought to examine the premises upon which the FCC acts.

FCC

The FCC believes that our broadcast system, by and large, *does* serve the public interest. That is a view on which reasonable men may differ; but as an FCC premise, it puts the burden of proof, in adversary hearings, on cable television.

Secondly, the agency is committed to a national broadcasting scheme based on vigorous local stations serving local fare as well as network programs. Here the Commission seems to have confused the Platonic idea of a local station with its physical incarnation. Commissioners Nicholas Johnson and Kenneth A. Cox reported in their famous study of Oklahoma stations, for example, that "the concept of local service is largely a myth."

The FCC's third and final premise is that the sow's ear of UHF may yet be transmuted into a silk purse, no matter what today's profit-and-loss figures suggest.

In that context, the FCC views cable television as a threat to some independent VHF stations, existing UHF stations, and even to UHF stations yet unborn.

But nobody knows if cable competition will, in fact, kill struggling UHFs. Nobody knows if the UHFs will make it, even with protection from cable. The FCC is stunting the growth of a new industry armed with thousands of channels. It is doing so to give the 70 conventional UHF outlets a chance to become profitable. How long will the FCC stick to that posture? As the President's Task Force noted, holding the line against distant signals is a "temporizing solution which, though avowedly temporary, risks becoming, in effect, a permanent decision."

Undoubtedly the Commission is reluctant to give up on investment in UHFs. But hard information is lacking. The only way to get the needed facts

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and figures is to allow CATV to import distant signals, as envisioned in the Great Compromise.

Imported programs will not add significantly to diversity because most stations carry the same network programs and very few have shows of their own. But they will enable CATV to add subscribers, thereby providing additional revenue with which to support original programs by cable.

Remember that a cable television company has plenty of channels—enough to carry local stations, bring in out-of-town stations, and still have several channels left over on which to originate programs. In fact, about 10 per cent do some local programs—live, on film, or on videotape. And half the systems use the empty channels to transmit pictures of a newswire, a stock-market ticker, or a time-and-weather display.

At this point, the economics of CATV encourage diversity. Since the capital costs of a system are non-recurring, the way to enhance profits is to win more subscribers. Because cable's empty channels are relatively cost-free, the operator has an incentive to use them for original programs that will interest minority viewers whose tastes are not served by the mass medium and who would not otherwise subscribe.

That is happening. A suburban system in the East devotes a single channel exclusively to baby-sitting features, like cartoons. Manhattan Cable is trying to get permission to show classic and foreign films in New York City neighborhoods whose residents patronize art theaters. A few small-town operations do live coverage of the public sessions of their local governing bodies.

Morton David, who runs a small cable TV company in New York City, says he wants to originate the ultimate in television programming—mood pictures as background to living-room conversations (otherwise known as Pictures to Ignore Television By). "It's the kind of television you can have on," explains David, "when you have guests in your home and you don't want to hear machine-gun fire or see nuns flying, and you don't want to be distracted by hard-sell campaigns about hemorrhoids... something that's not interrupted by ads and which really doesn't attract your eye too much."

More constructively, perhaps, the potential for programming addressed to pressing social needs is enormous. A channel serving a municipality could offer in-service training to policemen or physicians. Community organizations in the ghetto might run programs on how to find a job or on Black History.

If subscription revenues support such small-audience programming, television can achieve the diversity of the magazine business. Networks would continue to serve the mass audience (à la *Life, Look, Reader's Digest*) while cable systems would seek to please minority audiences (like *The Washington Monthly, Harper's, Architectural Forum*).

There is a rub. Subscription revenues will pay for a camera-on-a-clock or stock-market ticker, or low-cost films, or even a small studio with one camera suitable for interviews. But they are not likely to pay for much more.

Medium of the Mini-Masses

Cable TV itself, while trumpeting the virtues of modest public service programming, really has its eye on large production budgets and audiences to match. The industry wants the kinds of programs and profits that would accrue from advertising or pay TV. The cable people themselves are divided about which way to go.

Proponents of advertising argue that local pharmacies, gas stations, hardware stores—which cannot afford

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the rates of over-the-air stations—would be able to buy time on cable TV. Presumably, such advertising, in turn, would help sales of their products.

Although the N.A.B. had been determined to keep cable TV from carrying any advertising, it switched its position under terms of the short-lived Great Compromise. Under its terms—while they lasted—the N.A.B. and the N.C.T.A. agreed that each CATV company should be allowed to carry commercials on one—but only one—of its many channels.

That clearly is not in the public interest. It means that subscribers would pay twice for what they see on cable—once by subscribing and once more through the inclusion of advertising costs in the prices of products advertised. Even more important, commercials would determine cable TV programming on the "commercial channel," just as they determine all conventional programming now. The local druggist is as anxious as Procter & Gamble to reach all potential consumers of Ivory soap. The cable company will help itself by helping him. And cable TV will seek a wider audience, becoming a sort of mini-mass medium.

To be blunt, advertising means that cable TV will join radio and television as a marketing tool. For this reason, FCC should prohibit the sale of time on cable.

Pay TV

But why did the N.A.B. agree to competition from cable for the advertiser's dollar? This was the *quid pro quo*: "...both organizations agree that CATV systems receiving broadcast programs would be prohibited from interconnecting for the purpose of distributing entertainment programming."

A translation of that N.C.T.A.—N.A.B. release would read: "We hereby rule out a nationwide system of pay-TV."

Pay-TV is an alternative to advertising as a means of financing original programming on CATV. Under this plan, a CATV subscriber would pay an additional sum, over and above his usual monthly fee, for any special program he wanted to see. (A viewer who tried to free-load would only receive a scrambled signal.)

The other large potential source of CATV profits—pay-TV via cable—is the single most plausible explanation for the vast sums of capital going into big-city cable systems. In New York City alone, TelePrompTer, Hughes Aircraft, Time, Inc., and Westinghouse are serious investors.

Wiring the concrete jungle is expensive. But these investors anticipate a reward from thousands of subscribers, each of whom will pay a small sum to see original programs. Morton David says that pay-TV via cable will be a multi-billion-dollar industry:

"In the American economic system, if you have the possibility of the emergence of a 10- or 20-billion-dollar industry, you can't stop that no matter how you try to sit on it...in effect, the movie theater owners are fighting a losing battle."

Which leaves the seemingly insoluble riddle of cable television. Its potential for diversity lies in originating programs on some of those cost-free channels. But it costs lots of money to produce television programs.

Cable systems may soon bring their imported programs into the nation's mainstream markets under a reasonable copyright system. That will permit them to sell more subscriptions and, perhaps, underwrite some origination with the revenues.

It may be in the public interest to stop right there. But if we want more, we will have to pay for it. CATV and broadcasting now agree that we should do so through advertising. Advertising determines programming. Pay-TV, in

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theory, offers a choice and promises huge revenues. The FCC ought to explore how to use pay-TV to subsidize diversity. To do so would upset the broadcast industry but probably not destroy it.

Ownership

Technology and economic structure aside, cable presents a unique ownership problem with great implications for the public interest. Government has always recognized, at least theoretically, that the media are too important in a democratic state to be held by a few hands. The FCC, therefore, prohibits a single company from owning more than one TV station in a community or more than five VHF and two UHF stations anywhere. But the owner of a single cable system may control 20 channels of communication.

Perhaps the most rational approach would be to regulate CATV as a carrier rather than as a broadcaster. Outsiders would lease air time. That way, the company could own and manage its system but surrender control over what the channels carry.

Pay-TV probably will hurt the movie house business. The likelihood that pay-TV will arrive by cable has already rallied theater owners all over the U.S. to the cause of "free television" whenever cable systems seek permission to show movies.

"Free television"—i.e., conventional television—fears nationwide pay-TV. Broadcasters say that pay-TV will outbid even the networks for professional football games and new feature films, then reach for the best comedy and dramatic shows. Eventually, they argue, "free television" would be left with the worst entertainment. The networks' ability to underwrite expensive newsgathering facilities would be the next victim. Ultimately, the entire system might collapse. But if the Great Compromise is executed, it will end that TV nightmare.

It is easy to be amused at the spectacle of commercial broadcasters defending themselves against free enterprise, particularly when "free television" isn't free. Economist Harold J. Barnett of St. Louis University estimates its cost per family in set amortization, repair, antennas and electricity at $100 a year or $7 billion nationwide. But the recent pay-TV experiment in Hartford confirms at least the beginning of the broadcasters' argument. The Zenith-RKO General project there was most popular when it aired sports and movies.

Yet pay-TV can, it is agreed, be very profitable. What if pay-TV on a single cable channel could subsidize varied programming on the remaining channels without destroying conventional broadcasting?

Unfortunately, nobody knows if that will work. The FCC recently authorized pay-TV but restricted its use of sports and films to such an extent that little can be learned from it. A better test could come out of New York City, where Mayor John V. Lindsay set up a task force, under Fred Friendly of the Ford Foundation, to study cable.

Friendly's planners suggested that the city franchise CATV operations on the condition that each company provide 18 channels in its neighborhood, the 18 allocated this way:

—11 to carry New York's existing VHF and UHF stations;

—3 reserved for use by the municipal government;

—4 for program origination.

Of these last four, two channels would be operated by the cable company: one would be devoted to public service programs only and the company could use the other any way it saw fit. (The company would operate the remaining two channels as a carrier,

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leasing air time to outside users.)

Mayor Lindsay's advisors assumed that the cable operator would introduce advertising or, more likely, pay-TV on that single channel whose use they did not restrict. But the test is indefinitely postponed on account of political weather; Lindsay shelved his Task Force report under pressure from the movie exhibitors and television networks.

(Lindsay's Task Force urged that two channels in each cable system operate as carriers. But Paul Laskin, an author of the report, says the Task Force was not particularly interested in ownership; it was interested in how to guarantee public access to the medium. That is a revolutionary and splendid idea.)

Cable TV also presents the classic ownership problems. Newspapers, telephone companies (not AT&T), broadcasters (CBS, RCA, Kaiser), conglomerates (General Tire & Rubber), equipment manufacturers (Jerrold) own CATV systems.

Kihn's Crusade

Consider San Francisco, where the *Chronicle* is in a joint operating agreement with the *Examiner*, the city's only other daily newspaper. The *Chronicle*'s management owns KRON-TV, a VHF station affiliated with NBC, as well as cable television franchises in the Bay area.

KRON-TV employed a news cameraman named Al Kihn. Kihn is a character: he thinks journalism is supposed to help citizens solve problems. His basic complaint—difficult as it is to substantiate—is that KRON's news and public affairs coverage was shaped by its corporate interest. "Nobody knows what isn't being said," he argues. "In fact, it's almost everything." Even what *is* said is determined by corporate considerations so that, in sum, Kihn argues, viewers do not get the information they need to think and act upon.

Kihn was sufficiently unhappy to write to the FCC, opposing renewal of KRON's license. His "corporate interest" argument may be a bit abstract to be argued successfully in an adversary system, but he offered hard charges, too. Kihn told the FCC that the station management refused to allow the news department to report on the joint operating agreement between the dailies until it was put into effect.

He said the station used its news department to flatter municipal authorities in towns where it sought cable television franchises. Kihn named a specific town where *Chronicle* broadcasting has, in fact, obtained a CATV franchise.

The station denies the charges. It suggests that Kihn is arrogantly trying to substitute his judgment for the licensee's; it has appended to its response a lengthy recital of the station's public-service accomplishments.

Whatever the number of public-service programs, says Kihn, "it's a poverty diet. You can log it, you know, and you can tell the FCC you've done it...but the FCC doesn't know what has been said at all. I can say these things about KRON, and yet they do more local documentaries than any other station. It's just that I'm concerned about what they put into these documentaries. Nobody knows the considerations that are...making those programs what they are, whether documentary or news." Kihn fears that cable TV will be "in the same hands, with same considerations."

As part of the FCC's new look, and to the surprise of almost everybody in the communications sub-government, Kihn's charges will be aired in a public hearing on KRON's license-renewal application. The hearing also will look into the issue of media concentration.

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As for Kihn, he's no longer employed at KRON. He has retained a lawyer, and he contends that he has been followed by private investigators. He says that the private investigators have also asked his former wife whether he is part of a conspiracy to win KRON's license and whether he has ever, in one investigator's words, espoused "the overthrow of the Establishment." It should be an entertaining hearing.

The FCC, meanwhile, is pursuing an inquiry into ownership patterns in the cable industry. Commissioner Johnson says that study is proceeding at "a leisurely pace."

It would be a mistake to blame the FCC for the failure to develop rational policy aimed at shaping cable television—or broadcasting in general—in the public interest. The Commission is itself the victim of an irrational decision-making process. It is under-financed, under-staffed, and under pressure.

Presidents have consistently built Commission majorities which define the public interest as—more or less—the safety of invested capital.

The 1500-man FCC staff is neither large enough nor skilled enough to cope with the complexities of communications policy or the regulation and administration of a host of communications activities. For most of its information, the Commission is forced to depend upon industrial parties with an economic stake in the outcome of its deliberations.

Although nominally an independent agency, the FCC is dependent upon both the Executive and the Congress. Broadcasters control access to television, a point not lost on politicians. Congress rarely provides the FCC with policy guidelines. In fact, notwithstanding the onrush of technology—integrated circuit, transistor, TV, improved coaxial cable, computer, satellite—Congress appears satisfied that the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is sufficient unto the day.

Communications Policy

When President Johnson decided to seek guidance on communications policy in August, 1967, he by-passed the FCC. He assembled a task force from among 15 government agencies with communications responsibilities and chose as its chairman Eugene Rostow, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Johnson asked for policy recommendations on a more rational use of the spectrum, on domestic and international communications, on the use of telephones, computers, and satellites, and on the role of cable in television broadcasting.

As noted, the Rostow report strongly supports cable television while recommending the preservation of over-the-air service. But more important than the substantive recommendations is the Task Force plan for improving the way government makes decisions in communications policy. Specifically, the report urges a new Executive branch agency to make that policy. And the report calls for the creation of special institutes, perhaps on the nation's campuses, to study communications policy.

Both suggestions make sense. What's also needed is a citizen's organization to participate in making the decisions, by learning and by lobbying.

The 450-page Rostow report went to the White House last December 7. Broadcasters and cable television companies already had bootleg copies. So did Comsat, AT&T, the computer companies—everybody, in fact, with a dollars-and-cents stake in the inquiry's outcome. That is to be expected; industry was the source of most of the Task Force's information. And communications lawyers earn their fees. Weeks before the final report reached the

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President, I visited a cable TV promoter in the Far West. He threw a draft of the appropriate chapter across the desk. On it was a covering letter from his Washington attorneys.

President Johnson chose not to release the report, although excerpts quickly found their way into the press. When the Nixon team moved into the White House, aides could not even locate the report for a while; they had to rely on unofficial copies.

The Nixon team knew that the Task Force stance on cable would make no friends in the broadcast industry. And AT&T was less than ecstatic because the report favors Comsat as trustee of a domestic satellite program and recommends that a single entity (Comsat again?) replace the several overseas carriers. At best, the Administration said to itself, everybody might forget the report; at worst, Mr. Nixon might be linked to its views. Perhaps it could be released in a manner that would emphasize the President's distance from it. The White House wavered.

Finally, Congressman Torbert H. Macdonald (D-Mass.), who heads the communications subcommittee of the House Commerce Committee, persuaded Rostow to testify on cable TV, with or without the report. On May 19th, on the eve of Rostow's appearance, the White House sent the document along, with an emphatic disclaimer of responsibility for what it says. It had been four months since the Administration took office.

Thanks to the Government Printing Office, anyone willing to pay $4.50 can now read the final report of the President's Task Force on Communications Policy.

But if broadcasting is to be reshaped in the public interest, the public must know what it is missing and why and how to get it. Yet the polls say that more than half the population gets most of its news from broadcasting.

I have seen no confirmation in *Variety* of a report that the industry has high hopes for a situation comedy based on the Task Force report. But unreliable sources say it will be aired where the Smothers Brothers used to be. ■

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

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Memo of the Month:

(This feature, new in this issue, will recur as frequently as our readers supply us with appropriate examples.)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF LABOR
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL

The 1969 Savings Bond Campaign will commence in the Department of Labor on April 21. In order to demonstrate that Department management enthusiastically endorses the campaign, it is planned to use supervisory employees as canvassers. The basic guidelines under which they will operate are:

1. There will be no pressure put upon employees, but all will be seriously urged to sign up.

2. Please emphasize that in making the Department of Labor a stimulating place to work we are building an esprit de corps and unity of purpose. We particularly, want to excel in pro-

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grams where we can be compared with others. Therefore, all employees are urged to respond to this appeal.

3. Payroll deduction is a convenient way of saving, helps support the Government and, of course, is a sound and valuable investment, but the paramount appeal by the Department is widespread participation in this joint effort, not investment.

4. The Government has set a goal of 80 percent participation in the bond payroll savings plan. However, the Department of Labor likes to excel in responding to worthy causes, to do just a little better than other agencies. Therefore, we are setting ourselves a goal of at least 90 percent employee participation. Many other organizations both in Government and private industry regularly exceed this figure so the target is not unreasonable.

5. Any person who does not sign the card after a discussion with his supervisor will be talked to by the next higher level of supervision to insure he or she is fully aware of the importance the Department places on this program. If discussion at these two levels of supervision does not result in participation, no higher referrals will be made.

6. Employees should be advised that any payroll deduction authorization effective in July will count in this year's drive. Therefore, it is appropriate to point out that there will be a substantial Government-wide pay raise effective in July.

7. It is the fact of participation, not the size of the deduction, that is important in this particular drive, a minimum deduction may be all that some will wish. No encouragement for higher amounts should be extended in such cases.

8. The payroll deduction method is reliable. Employees now receive their bonds regularly and promptly.

Please accept my thanks for your efforts in this program. Only through leadership on the part of its supervision can the Department expect to achieve the leadership position to which it aspires.

/S/ James D. Hodgson
Under Secretary

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The Committee Revisited

by Walter Goodman

Students for a Democratic Society had as much chance of escaping the attentions of the House Un-Ameri—oops—Internal Security Committee as Frankenstein's monster had of getting through Hollywood without meeting Wolfman.

S.D.S., of course, is the monster allegedly fathered by a permissive-liberal Dr. Frankenstein. June's opening installment of a serial which seems certain to continue into the far future did nothing to stir the slumbrous air of the capital. That, it was a flat beginning for so epic a Confrontation is a tribute to the new committee's new way of going about its work.

How new is the committee—which will henceforward have to be insulted as HISC instead of as HUAC? Well, the new chairman, Richard Ichord (D-Mo.), has been a member since 1963; he owes his present eminence to the deaths and political calamities of his senior colleagues. Ichord experienced his baptism of fire last October when he presided over unmanageable hearings involving several of the more colorful personalities of the Chicago convention demonstrations, such as Yippies Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman and S.D.S. emeritus Tom Hayden.

On the Republican side, lingering members John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, Richard L. Roudebush of Indiana, and Albert W. Watson of South Carolina, who was a Democrat prior to LBJ's Great Betrayal of the Confederacy, have been joined by William J. Scherle of Iowa, thus maintaining an ideological balance somewhere to the right of Ronald Reagan. All the Democrats, with



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the exception of the chairman, have been freshly recruited. Beginning at the low-seniority end, we have Louis Stokes of Ohio, brother of Cleveland's Mayor Carl and the first Negro to be admitted to committee membership; L. Richardson Preyer of North Carolina; Edwin W. Edwards of Louisiana; and, from Florida, Claude Pepper. *Claude Pepper*?!* Now, as ever, the committee is in the hands of Southerners and Midwesterners; the Northeast and Northwest go unrepresented, and the big cities receive scant acknowledgement.

The June hearings in Washington served as a coming-out party for the Internal Security Committee, and all members, with the exception of Pepper, stopped by for at least a hello. Ashbrook, brightest of the resident Republicans, put in the briefest appearance and went off, thereby undermining the I.Q. level on his side of the table.

To begin its refurbished life, the committee directed its attention at what the Congressmen took to calling "a fracas" that occurred at Georgetown University last March. In an effort to stir up support at that conservative campus, and perhaps to retain their franchise within the revolutionary movement, Georgetown's small S.D.S. cadre managed to break up a meeting at which

*Since his readmission to Congress in 1962, this dimly remembered marcher in Henry Wallace's Army of Gideon has not taken the opportunity to vote for abolition of the Un-American Activities Committee.

Walter Goodman is the author of The Committee, a history of the House Committee on *Un-American Activities*.



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Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco was to speak—about "Law and the Campus." Doorways were blocked as demonstrators attempted to lay hands on the mayor. One young activist knocked over the speaker's stand, and another, on being given the microphone, notified the assemblage, which included several Congressmen and their wives, a federal judge and other notables, that Alioto was a motherfucker. There were fist fights between student ushers and the S.D.S. troopers, reinforced by allies from George Washington and American Universities. The mayor, the Congressmen, and the judge beat a retreat through a rear door.

Despite the apparent victory, S.D.S. in fact suffered a considerable loss of sympathy around Georgetown that night. Its previous activities on campus—disrupting ROTC ceremonies, showing a film celebrating the Black Panthers, sponsoring a talk by Tom Hayden, and denouncing the "military-industrial-university complex" on all possible occasions—had won it an attentive hearing, if no great surge of support. But the March attack on fellow students in an unabashed effort to shut down an open meeting was something too much. By refraining from calling in the Metropolitan police, the Georgetown administrators had deprived the S.D.S. of their cherished hour of confrontation, as well as the student solidarity that cops usually manage to bring out. Yet the majority opinion at the committee table seemed to be that the authorities had not shown sufficient muscle, since only one of the perpetrators of the assault had been punished (and that merely by suspension, instead of, say, hanging).

For roughly a quarter of a century, it has been the custom in this committee for the new chairman to knock his predecessors, at least by implication, and to pledge to do things better hereafter. And so Chairman Ichord opened the June hearings by recalling that in the past the committee had habitually summoned witnesses who declined to cooperate. From now on, he promised, the committee would leave hostile witnesses to heaven and make do with cooperative and informative persons. To carry forward this program, Ichord had hired as his staff director and chief counsel an insufferably clean-cut fellow named Donald Sanders, lately with the FBI. (Francis McNamara, the former V.F.W. functionary who had run the committee for the past five years, took his demotion to "director of research" hard, and resigned. The present staff harbors at least three young men whose sideburns descend below the ear line; I do not know what this signifies.)

In an effort to bring order to proceedings which have not always been marked by that quality, Sanders played the part of an assistant district attorney, as if he were seeking to pin down responsibility for the Affair Alioto in preparation for trial. It seemed an odd endeavor for a committee of the legislative branch—and a tedious one. It may seem captious after years of decrying the committee's extravagant indignities and indecencies to cavil at innocent boredom, but Sanders, who reads revolutionary slogans as though they were the week's receipts from the grain-and-feed store, put a heavy strain on one's attention. The only joy on the first afternoon came when a Florida policeman reported that an S.D.S. maiden had told him, "I'd like to kick your balls up your ass." (The New Left has had a liberating effect on the language permitted in Congressional hearings.)

Most of Sanders's witnesses were administrators and anti-S.D.S. students—including the editor of Georgetown's campus newspaper and the leader of its ROTC unit. Like a monomaniacal drill sergeant, the chief coun-

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sel led them over and over events which had long since been detailed in the press, or had gone unreported because they were of such slight consequence: "Did you observe Mayor Alioto enter the hall?" "Did you observe at orientation week a table at which was displayed material of S.D.S.?" "Did you observe any posters or signs at this sit-in?" Sanders took a collector's pleasure in the dozens of documents and photographs he inserted into the record as "exhibits." Regarding a flyer distributed throughout the campus, he asked a witness: "How did you come into possession of this document?" And then he asked the witness to describe the document. And then he read excerpts from the document. There was no question that the man was methodical, but it was difficult to discern the matter in his method.

The calling up of unfriendly witnesses for display purposes has long been a major source of complaint against the committee. For many years its members and staff have been charged, and rightly so, with engaging in exposure for exposure's sake. Now, by concentrating on witnesses who are not themselves under attack, the committee has managed to arouse (at least in this observer) another sort of disquiet. The subpoenaed administrators and students were brought to the hearing room for the main purpose of peaching on the opinions and actions of other students at Georgetown. Their testimony would doubtless be indispensable in a court where the S.D.S. rowdies were being tried for disturbing the peace. But to put such questions under the quite different auspices of the committee was to invite a kind of betrayal. Administrators' efforts to resist subpoenas issued by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the academic records of S.D.S. students at other universities have so far proved unavailing; but it remained for the House Internal Security Committee to have administrators (priests, to boot) bring the records into a public hearing and then read from them. "I consider it a privilege to be here," said Georgetown's Director of International Student Affairs.

It is remarkable that the two Georgetown administrators and the several students summoned behaved with as much dignity as they did. For the most part, they declined invitations to join committee members in demanding the blood of S.D.S. disrupters. But the need for putting these men in so unbecoming a position remains doubtful, and the practice can only prove invidious.

The committee also called up a *New York Times* reporter, Anthony Ripley, who covered an S.D.S. convention in Lansing, Michigan, in June, 1968. Ripley, with the approval of his employer, had refused to testify voluntarily, but appeared, accompanied by a *Times* lawyer, in response to a subpoena. He was called up, explained Ichord, so that he might swear to the fact that he had heard an S.D.S. officer say, "I consider myself a revolutionary communist"—a quote that staff investigators had cleverly discovered in Ripley's account of the proceedings in the *Times*. Ripley said at the outset that his being summoned for such a purpose would make the job of covering radical activities rather more difficult than it already is, but neither he nor his attorney suggested that a matter of principle might be lurking in the vicinity.

Ripley's testimony consisted largely of readings from his stories in the *Times*; he gave away no confidences. Yet in compelling this reporter to testify as to what he had seen and heard at the convention, the committee was turning him into an undercover informant *ex post facto*. He had been ac-

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credited to the Lansing convention as a reporter, and for him to become a witness, even a reluctant and not especially informative witness, was not in the contract. Perhaps the *Times* and Ripley were taken unawares and the issue of whether such a committee may call the press into its service in this manner will be argued out when Counsel Sanders tries it again. Let us hope so.

The June hearings produced no revelations about S.D.S.—but they did throw some light on what may be expected from the committee's present membership. Roudebush, Preyer, and the gorgeous Edwards, freshly outfitted each day in shimmering silver or riverboat blue, produced from their wells of banality expressions of allegiance to the nation's values and accomplishments. (Edwards must be credited with the funniest line of the show. He said: "I don't want to get into a philosophical argument.") Watson and Scherle, a husky pair, sat shoulder to shoulder, two linebackers ready to smother any breath of sensibility that might escape a witness. "Believe me," said Scherle, an advocate of backbone, "if I had been there [the Alioto meeting] at my age, there would've been a real confrontation." Watson made leaden jokes about how boy and girl students look alike nowadays. He also told one of the administrators, who was earnestly and ingenuously trying to explain the difficulties encountered by universities in responding to disruptive tactics, that there was only one language "these wild radicals" understand—"and that's firmness!" Watson is the sort of politician whom it is impossible to quote without seeming to do him an injustice. These are not men destined to lead a repression, but they will do to start a scene or two.

Casting about for ways to register his apartness from his colleagues, Stokes indulged in a variety of harmless gestures: he objected to the submission of an S.D.S. flyer because it was not identified to his satisfaction; he pointed out that demand Number 10 of a Black Panther manifesto was not revolutionary. This frivolity subjected him to rebuttal from Watson; their dispute was moderated by the boyish-looking Ichord, whose jutting lower lip and sober mien were not quite enough to transform him into a heavyweight. The Georgetown students present had surely enjoyed higher-class debating in their locker rooms.

At length Stokes settled on an argument which was used against the original committee of Martin Dies by the original committee liberal, Jerry Voorhis, 30 years ago. He maintained that the issues being exploited by S.D.S.—Vietnam, racism, poverty—warranted action; instead of figuring out how to squash dissent, Congress ought to be doing something about the real problems. In this untaxing way, Stokes, a first-termer, will probably win his spurs in the liberal community. If experience can be trusted, he will in time ride away from the committee toward less arid territory.

It is not likely that any addition to the committee's negligible legislative record will come out of these hearings: the serious bills on campus disorders are being developed elsewhere. Nor ought we to expect any news about the revolutionary inclinations of S.D.S. that S.D.S. itself has not been only too eager to give us. The committee is simply doing its thing. Its scenarios have ordinarily been composed with an eye to their effect outside the Capitol, and the latest performances are intended as a contribution to the rising pressures on college administrators and state legislators to clamp down. The form of the new old House Committee on Internal Security has changed somewhat; the function remains pretty much what it has always been.■

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BOOKS:

Pounding the Pavement

A review by James D. Dilts

Road to Ruin
by A. Q. Mowbray
J. B. Lippincott, 240 pages. $5.95.

One evening not long ago, during a discussion of why cities seem so intent on dismembering themselves with multi-lane highways, an architect friend of mine put forth this explanation: "Every man assumes that he has a God-given right to drive his car downtown." He was correct. My friend might have added that this same man—who is really you and me and him—also assumes a God-given right to load up the family at vacation time and follow the white line right up into his favorite park.

The trouble is that 99,000,000 (the AAA's figure) American motorists—given constant encouragement by the automobile, oil, and asphalt interests which profit from such travel—are asserting their automotive rights. And in the very act of making a downtown or a wilderness area "accessible" by building a superhighway through it, we are systematically destroying what lies at the end of the journey. That, in essence, is the subject of this book. Its author, A.Q. Mowbray, an editor for a technical society in Philadelphia, has also produced the first detailed attack on the U.S. highway program.

"There are those who say the American Dream is a split-level in the suburbs with a half-acre, a guaranteed annual income, and membership in the Best Club...." writes Mowbray. "Not so," he asserts. "The American Dream is to drive from coast to coast without encountering a traffic light." Presumably that is why, although there is already one mile of road and street for every square mile of land in the country, we are building a 41,000-mile interstate highway system which will have cost some $56.5 billion by the time it is scheduled for completion in 1975. Even if it is finished by then, one gathers that it is only the beginning. The American

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Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) has recommended to Congress the expenditure of $78 billion more, in the decade from 1975 to 1985, for several thousand more interstate miles and an "upgrading" of the present ones.

The largest public works project in history, the interstate highway program is a masterpiece of illogic and extravagance rivaling even the Great Wall of China (than which, the author notes, it will be 30 times longer). The program is illogical because, in denying funds to more efficient forms of urban transportation, it is creating the very traffic congestion it is supposed to alleviate. It is extravagant because the human costs, only now beginning to be measured, are tremendously high.

For one thing, Mowbray points out, people are being uprooted—and that is not too strong a term—at the rate of 90,000 persons a year. Because the lava-like flow of expressways in cities seeks the path of least resistance, the roads tend to run through poor neighborhoods populated by Negroes and the elderly, many of whom have invested their life savings in their homes and—the supreme irony—don't own a car. Both groups, the Negroes because of discrimination, the elderly because of fixed incomes, are ill-equipped to find suitable replacement housing, and the effect of forcibly moving them is catastrophic. Mowbray quotes Jane Jacobs to the effect that "whole communities are torn apart and sown to the winds, with a reaping of cynicism, resentment, and despair that must be heard and seen to be believed."

To see it and hear it for himself, Mowbray interviewed several families in the path of the expressway on Lee Street in Philadelphia, a quiet, well-kept, lower-middle-class community of dock and warehouse workers. They didn't want to move. They fought the road, but finally gave up and looked for some place to go.

One man, a year from retirement, "walked around the house in a state of great anxiety, saying over and over 'Where will we go?' 'What will we do?'" He was spared the agony of moving by falling dead of a heart attack. Another family, the last to leave the Lee Street block, told Mowbray what it was like living there after the others had gone. "'As soon as the residents moved out, the vandals moved in. It was frightening. The breaking in of the empty houses all around us was terrible. As fast as the houses emptied, the scavengers would come in and strip them, then children would break all the windows and start fires in the empty houses.'"

While the devastation of neighborhoods is the most obvious effect of expressways, the by-products are no less harmful: air pollution (the automobile is the main contributor to it), the declining tax base in already poor cities (clearance for highway projects is a prime reason for it), and formless suburban sprawl (cars cause it).

These things are seldom considered in the glorified traffic studies that provide what rationale there is for building superhighways through town. Nor do the studies describe the physical results of their recommendations. During the three decades from 1930 to 1960, Mowbray writes, "the available floor space in the central business district of Los Angeles increased by about 10 per cent. The amount of space devoted to hotels was down 12 per cent, institutions down 12 per cent, manufacturing and wholesale down 11 per cent, retail down 16 per cent, services down eight per cent, offices up 15 per cent, government and 'quasi-public' up 80 per cent, inside parking up 40 per cent and surface parking up 203 per cent. These statistics suggest that downtown Los Angeles is becoming an area of widely spaced office towers and massive government buildings adrift in a sea of

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parked and moving automobiles—a concept that any aerial view will confirm." Few places are as fascinated with expressways as Los Angeles but the L.A. syndrome can be observed in numerous cities that have experimented with them.

Another important aspect of highways that has been little noticed in the furor over cities is their equally adverse effect on parks and wilderness areas. Mowbray examines a number of cases. A typical one concerns the Nestucca sandspit on the Oregon coast about 70 miles south of Portland. The highwaymen wanted to move U.S. Highway 101, located inland at that point, to run along the sandspit, a 3.7-mile undeveloped peninsula of beach.

The highway engineers said they wanted to put the road "in close proximity to the beaches in order to open them up, to give access to them, so people can use them and preserve them for many years in the future." The man leading the opposition to this road (a state official, interestingly enough) "could not understand this reasoning." Besides bringing in thousands of trash-strewing tourists, he argued, the right-of-way for the highway would itself consume 109 acres of sand on "one of the finest sections of beach and ocean view property that is left in Oregon." (The case is still being argued.)

While there has been a great deal of talk about *where* to build highways (through the park or the ghetto, the valley or the sandspit) and *how* to build them (elevated or depressed, with or without "joint development"), the real question is *whether* to build them. There are, after all, other ways to go.

But after years of ineffective competition with the automobile, these alternate ways are in bad shape. Mowbray recites the dismal statistics: 235 private transit companies, almost all of them urban, have gone out of business since 1954; in just 6 months in 1967, 75 inter-city railroad passenger runs were abandoned. That leaves the planes, and the airways are now getting as crowded as the roads. "What is plainly needed is a sweeping renaissance of the railroad," says Mowbray.

For travelers over moderate distances, or even long ones, the railroad offers an attractive alternative to the highway. And for commuters, the rail is obviously the answer: "An eight-lane freeway can carry 9,000 persons per hour in each direction at a capital cost of $1,670 per person. A subway or elevated train can carry 50,000 per hour at a capital cost of $440 per person. Rapid transit does five times the work at one-fourth the cost." (One might add that a railroad track takes up a good deal less room than a freeway, whether it's in a city or on a sandspit.)

So what are we waiting for? First of all, for American car drivers to start looking at the new models long enough to realize that they have a great capacity for destruction (including self-destruction) as well as transportation. Secondly, for the downtown business groups to understand that human beings, not automobiles, come to buy goods in their stores and work in their offices and factories, and that more and more expressways and parking lots aren't the only answer. Finally, for the road gang to release its stranglehold on the Highway Trust Fund, which has collected the federal taxes on gasoline, tires, and spare parts for the last 13 years and doled them out to the states in 90 per cent shares to be used only for more road-building.

The only way to "balance" the transportation system is to spend less trust-fund money on highways and more on mass transit systems in cities. (This year, $175 *million* is available for mass transit; $4.5 *billion* for highways.) What passes for transportation policy in this country is a road construction program.

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The two are not the same. As Mowbray says, "The question of where to spend the public funds that are available for transportation should be answered on the merits of the various forms of transportation, not on the source of the funds."

Mowbray has provided a valuable critique of the interstate highway program, especially through his case histories of wilderness areas and city neighborhoods violated by the roads. But there are gaps in the book. For instance, he has barely touched on the operations of the road gang—the businessmen, engineers, and politicians who jealously guard the trust fund and keep the money and concrete flowing. This is the heart of America's transportation mess.

And Mowbray's unrelieved tone of outrage tends to become tedious by the time one reaches the end of the book. After all, *some* highways, even in the cities, have been well-designed, efficient additions to the transportation system.

But in the main, things are as bad as he says and are likely to get worse. Mowbray puts his faith in "a voracious micro-organism that has been chomping through highways in Australia. The tiny bug, *Desulfovibrio desulfuricans*, consumes the oily substance in bituminous materials, leaving the highway dry and brittle and subject to quick destruction by the elements."

This "heroic bug" sounds too good to be true. (Is it a put-on? Would it survive the journey to America?) Besides, it would be nice to think that the people are still in charge.■

The Arms of Kuss

A review by Peggy Anderson

The War Business: The International Trade in Armaments
by George Thayer
Simon and Schuster, 383 pages, $6.95.

Fifty-five wars have been fought in the 24 years since 1945, George Thayer tells us, and 95 per cent of them have been fought in the underdeveloped areas of the world—with imported weapons.

This book is about the sale of arms throughout the world and the effects of that arms trade on world tensions. Thayer states his case simply: the arms trade "encourages arms races and transforms political conflicts into wars." He scarcely raises his voice as he painstakingly explains that arms—sometimes by their presence alone—have precipitated almost all the wars, and many of the political crises, since the arms trade began to boom in 1945. He argues that Nasser would not have dared provoke war with Israel had he been forced to rely on what weaponry he could scrounge from within the U.A.R.'s borders, nor would Sukarno have taken on Malaysia. The Nigerian civil war, the Indian-Pakistani war over Kashmir, the Yemeni civil war, the Congo, Korea,

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Vietnam—none of these would have happened, Thayer believes, if the parties involved had not had access to huge supplies of modern arms.

Thayer is a meticulous researcher with an apparent fondness for out-of-the-way topics. His 1967 book, *The Farther Shores of Politics*, explored extreme political movements in the United States; the one before that, in 1965, was about *The British Political Fringe*. His new book ably carries forward his habit of lowered voice and ample documentation. He lets his facts largely speak for themselves.

Those facts will make uncomfortable reading for Americans. Although not all the weapons involved in the wars he cites came from the United States, this country is the largest purveyor of arms in the world. And the chief trafficker in the United States is not a private merchant, in business for profit, but the United States government, "perhaps the world's most vocal proponent of disarmament."

Thayer leaves the reader in no doubt that America's reasons for getting into the arms trade in the first place made more sense than our reasons for staying in it. We began to give arms to our allies in 1940 because of the threat of a Nazi takeover in Europe. (Until then, most arms had been sold by private companies.) In furtherance of "containment" policy, the U.S. government continued to supply allies with surplus arms after the war ended. As Europe got back on its feet, it occurred to us to *sell* the arms, as a way of getting the gold flowing back in the right direction. When the surplus of arms ran out, we began to fill orders from abroad with up-to-date weapons off the assembly line.

In the 25 years since World War II, Thayer tells us, non-communist countries have given or sold $59 billion worth of military aid to other countries. The United States accounts for $50 billion of that sum—in aid that has gone to some 80 nations in all, at the rate of about $2 billion a year. And the rate is rising, although "containment" is no longer the rationale. Under the new names—"balance of power" and "balance of payments"—the U.S. will sell the most provocative matériel to non-communist countries, the only stipulation being that the recipient nation "promise" to use the purchase solely for defensive purposes.

Because the volume of our arms transactions exceeds that of any other nation, America is implicated more than any other nation in the results of those transactions. Among the achievements Thayer attributes to U.S. arms policy—and the high-pressure way it is conducted—are the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965; the fall of the Erhard government in Germany; Prime Minister Macmillan's resignation; the stirring up of Latin America; the general build-up of weapons around the world; the sale to underdeveloped countries of arms they don't need, can't afford, and may not even want; and much of the responsibility for the arms race.

Who in the American government is to be held accountable for these developments? The answer to that is the strongest part of the book. In a chapter called "The Pentagon Drummers," Thayer describes the government's arms-selling mechanism as a merchandising system that makes Hertz look like Number Two. What is chilling about this system, as Thayer unveils it, is that the bureaucracy considers it so ordinary a part of the business day. Accountability is not limited to, say, McNamara, Kennedy, and Johnson. They take responsibility for the policy, but its vigorous implementation must be credited to the Defense bureaucracy, under the leadership of one Henry John Kuss, Jr., whom Thayer misidentifies as a "Deputy Under Secretary of Defense." Kuss, whose correct title is

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations, is America's chief arms salesman.

According to Thayer, Secretary McNamara set up Kuss's section to market abroad the five per cent of U.S.-manufactured military equipment that is not absorbed into the American military establishment. The stated objectives of ILN, however, are "to promote the defensive strength of our allies, consistent with our political-economic objectives, to promote the concept of cooperative logistics with our allies, and to offset the unfavorable balance of payments resulting from essential U.S. military deployment abroad." Kuss has a staff of 42 people, divided into teams with selling responsibility for different areas of the world. The staff, says Thayer, is loyal to a fault; perhaps that is because of Kuss's own enthusiasm for his job. "'If we possibly can,'" Thayer quotes him as having said, "'we want to sell, first, the whole airplane. If we can't, then we'll settle for selling major parts or for licensing. But to optimize sales, we've got to shoot first for the bigger package.'"

Supporting Kuss's efforts—the other part of the answer to the question of accountability—are people all over the nooks and crannies of government whose jobs are somehow related to our arms sales policy. They are to be found in the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, overseas American embassies, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, even the Department of Agriculture. And this is not a complete list. Thayer gives the complete list, elaborates, and then begins dropping his bombs:

> As is evident, the machinery in operation to ensure the success of the arms sales program is vast. Several knowledgeable experts estimate that the total number of people employed by the U.S. government whose jobs depend directly on the continuance of the [arms sales] policy exceeds 500,000. Not all of these departments or individuals push sales; most simply complement the policy in one way or another; some actually oppose it. But what they all have in common is a vested interest to see that the policy continues unchanged, for without it their jobs and/or departments have less, and in some cases no, reason for being. These facts in themselves do not make the arms sales policy right or wrong. What they do illustrate, however, is that there exists a built-in resistance in the U.S. government to any change in this policy.
>
> By their very nature, bureaucrats—and they are not alone—promote their own careers by seeking to expand the programs and policies for which they are responsible. To a bureaucrat it is the only measure of success. Thus they are empire builders: they hire more people, request more authority, and seek larger appropriations. For instance, between 1966 and 1968 Kuss' staff increased from 28 to 42 and his office costs increased from $564,000 to $700,000. Any cutback in a program or policy is a cutback in a bureaucrat's career; therefore, his survival and success are based on the augmentation and expansion of his responsibilities. Often this leads to a situation where, in order to preserve a career, a program is continued along other avenues even in the face of an order from higher up ordering that the program be cut back....

As Thayer sees it, the checks and balances which operate with more or less success in other areas of American foreign or domestic policy, are almost impotent—those that exist—in the case of arms policy. The President and the

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Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury make the most sensitive decisions on who can buy what weapons; but they never even know about the thousands of less sensitive decisions. Those are made—routinely—by Kuss and a very few other members of the arms fraternity. Individually, these decisions may seem minor, and often they are. Collectively, they form the arms policy of the most powerful country in the world.

Who can ride herd on the people who make these decisions? Almost no one, in Thayer's gloomy assessment. Arms vocabulary is arcane and can be made to seem even more so if Congress, for example, starts probing too deeply. Rubber stamps spelling "Confidential" and "Top Secret" can be applied to an inkpad and touched to paper in a twinkling of an eye. The Office of Munitions Control, set up to make sure arms go only where they're supposed to go (and not resold to a third party without approval), *"has no control over the sale of grant of weapons carried out by the U.S. government itself"* (emphasis added). Similarly, the job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is not to police Kuss' operation but to "participate in establishing policy." One high ACDA official told Thayer that it would not be realistic for that agency "to take an absolutist position against arms sales 'because no one would pay any attention to us.'" Perhaps the reason no one would pay any attention is that ACDA, like OMC, is under the State Department, which everyone knows is less powerful than the Pentagon. And the Pentagon

> ...is so large that it is almost impervious to outside influences. There are so many layers of leadership and bureaucracy in a place as big as the Pentagon that even a Secretary of Defense as astute as McNamara could be tuned into only so many of them. Significant "wars" are being fought at a lower level that he never heard about. What bothers many people is that Defense Department employees are, on the whole, decent and competent people; they have no evil intent. But with 27,000 employees in the Pentagon itself, another 3.5 million men and women in uniform, plus all the ancillary groups (industries and private research companies, for example) that feed off the department, the operation becomes virtually impossible to control and can often veer off onto a course that no one intended it to take. It is so vast that it has a motion and life of its own.

There is much more to *The Arms Business* than the American government's involvement in it. The first two chapters on the arms trade in private hands are colorful and interesting, but they take up almost half the book and could have been a separate volume entirely. Their length and detail sap the drama of the real story Thayer has to tell.

Part of the problem is that Thayer tends to paint a whole picture when a sketch would suffice. Reading the book is like sitting from noon till midnight in a movie theater playing Frankenstein. The first time the distorted, discolored hands close around the white throat of the heroine, you're frozen with fear. The second time, you are less tense but still engrossed. Once around again, and you might go out for popcorn. By the time Thayer has delineated the involvement of private arms merchants in skirmishes all over the globe, the reader is sated with detail. His eyes tend to glaze when the same routine is followed in the case of the American government, and once again in the case of other free-world governments, and finally in the case of the communists.

That is unfortunate. The reader should not be allowed to become so

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impatient with the medium that he loses the message or the outrage it occasions. Thayer's last chapter, in which he makes specific, sensible suggestions for curtailing activities of the monster which has been permitted to develop "a motion and life of its own," takes the glaze off the eyes by stating bluntly that this curtailment is an American responsibility. "If America seeks a more peaceful world" Thayer warns, "it must first set its own house in order. If it does not, there is little hope that others will. Indeed, if America does not do it soon, it may be too late for everyone."

That is a dramatic conclusion. Thayer's readers will not think it overstated.■

Up the Spleenwort

A review by Laurence I. Moss

America the Raped
by Gene Marine
Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 312 pages. $5.95.

America the Raped is a catalogue of horror stories about man's abuse of his environment. More significantly, it is an attempt by Gene Marine to give us an ecological conscience:

> ...we must save our ecosystems, not only because they may be pretty or because man may have a need to get away for recreation or meditation or the simple inhalation of fresh air, but because we may, someday, vitally need what they contain—and we cannot preserve even a single life form in its true manifestation if we take it from its natural home.

While it may be easier to mobilize public concern for the whooping crane, the California condor, the alligator, the cougar, and the gray whale than for the ebony spleenwort or the epiphytic algae, the genetic information preserved in these latter forms of life may be no less vital to us. And since we have no way of knowing which may be important to us in the future, Marine argues, we must preserve them all.

The villains of this book are the "Engineers." This is the term Marine uses to describe people (not exclusively engineers) with an "engineering mentality"—a predilection to approach a problem in the narrowest of terms and to make a critical policy decision without being aware of its environmental consequences.

In Marine's view, the most serious of an Engineer's assumptions is that there is some sort of determinism about the way things grow:

> The American assumption—that growth is somehow built into the system, that "automatic forces"

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mean that we "have to" meet certain needs, that the "growth rate" is handed down, chiseled in stone, from on high—has alway been... a wrong assumption. It has always been, in our planning, a policy disguised as an inevitability.

Today it is more than that. It is a downright danger. We cannot continue blindly to plan for an automatically assumed "growth rate" when we do not dare continue to grow at the same rate. We cannot prepare the legacy we owe to the world's tomorrow unless we are prepared to make a startling—to an American almost an unthinkable—decision.

It is time to stop.

Marine is on target here. It is astonishing how many of us have forgotten one of the elementary lessons of high-school algebra: that indefinite exponential growth is simply not possible in a finite system. What *is* inevitable is not that growth will continue but that it sooner or later will stop. Our technology may allow us to temporarily postpone widespread famine and disease, but only at the price of a deterioration of our physical environment and a loss in diversity of our biological environment. Why not consciously plan for equilibrium in population and use of resources—and achieve it sooner—rather than have it thrust upon us later by the psychological and physical effects of crowding and over-use?

Unfortunately, Marine has not come up with a plan for achieving equilibrium. As a reporter who has written widely on public issues over the last two decades, he apparently preferred to stick to reporting in this book. By not discussing possible remedies, he has made his conclusions less forceful and credible. Perhaps this is a subject for another book, one that would examine changes in governmental policies in key areas—such as population, investment, resource management, and taxation—and also attempt to outline a strategy for long-term equilibrium with a minimum of short-term discomfort.

Most of the book is devoted to examples of projects and policies that create, or threaten to create, ecological havoc. Marine is enraged by what is happening, and it shows in the tone of his writing; readers with a taste for a dispassionate weighing of the arguments may find that he comes on too strong. He is occasionally careless with the facts and figures he presents. (The Bureau of Reclamation, for example, estimated the cost of the proposed dams in the Grand Canyon at $750 million, not the $1.5 billion Marine cites; and he is wrong when he says that most radioactive wastes are held at reactor sites, or encased in lead and then in concrete and sunk in the ocean—they are, instead, separated from the fuel, concentrated, and stored underground in tanks, under continuous surveillance.) Such errors can be disconcerting, but they are not serious or numerous enough to invalidate his argument.

Inconsistency also intrudes now and again. He berates conservationists for failing to understand that we should save what is "ecologically meaningful" (whether or not it is beauiful, whether or not it is important for recreation or meditation). But then he goes on to give dozens of examples of conservationists who do understand the value of preserving ecosystems and who are, in fact, leading campaigns to save them. He makes ecosystem preservation (for science) the *sine qua non* of conservation and implicitly rejects arguments with a spiritual, cultural, or psychological basis. Yet he approvingly quotes Wallace Stegner's reminder that we are creatures

> ...made of water and chemicals but the children of sun and grass, and cousin by warm blood to birds and mammals. Though it is necessary for our survival to hus-

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band resources, it is necessary for our emotional health to husband natural things, and places where they may be known.

My comments are intended as gentle rebukes. Although *America the Raped* is not always carefully structured or consistent, it is a valuable contribution to the literature of conservation. It brings together information on many important issues and unhesitatingly strikes to the heart of our problems—a mindless worship of growth, coupled with ecological ignorance. Perhaps it is beyond human endurance to be completely dispassionate when discussing the destructive work of "the Engineers."

To give an example: One would be hard-pressed to find a reputable economist (much less an ecologist) who believes that the work of two agencies Marine mentions prominently—the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers—benefits the nation. Yet these agencies have taken on lives of their own, sustained by pork-barrel politics and largely independent of the Cabinet Secretaries to whom they nominally report. The leadership of recent Administrations has understood this, but the drastic action needed to correct the situation has not been proposed, much less taken. In the case of the Department of Defense, the typical explanation is that the Corps of Engineers' $1.2 billion annual budget is not a major item (which proves, I suppose, that if you've been at Defense for a while you think big). Who, unless he had a vested interest, would not be mad?

It is as yet too early to judge the degree to which the Nixon Administration attaches importance to the ecological and environmental issues raised in this book. Thus far there have been both hopeful and distressing signs. Marine would probably be cheered by Secretary Hickel's determined efforts to obtain a guaranteed water supply for the Everglades National Park, though he would note that the Federal Aviation Administration was at the same time supporting a new airport that would further interrupt the flow of water to the park and thereby exacerbate damage to the ecosystem there. He would be dismayed by Secretary Hickel's recent revocation of a formal administrative procedure for public hearings on questions relating to need, location, and design of proposed roads within units of the National Park system. He would be skeptical of the not-yet-defined, "unofficial" involvement of the public in broad questions of park policy which was offered as a substitute. He would perhaps regard the recent establishment of a cabinet-level Council on Environmental Quality as a hopeful sign, but would reserve judgment until it became clearer just how such a body will function and what it will accomplish in an atmosphere of intensely competing interests, where victims of technological development are largely unrepresented.

Marine quotes an apt analogy by Dr. John Cantlon of the National Science Foundation:

> It would be utterly repugnant to all except the hard-core anti-intellectual to encourage a madman to tour world libraries randomly destroying books. Such a practice, permitted to continue unabated, would surely result in the total loss of some works and the disappearance of the local translations of others. The genetic information contained in species populations as well as the ecological information content of the total functioning array of organisms in an ecological system represents an irreplaceable resource.

It is a message that engineers, economists, and decision-makers in business and government would do well to remember in evaluating the consequences of their actions, lest they be accused of being "Engineers." ■

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